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ABSTRACT
The transportation system in the US is transforming into an intelligent cyberphysical-systems (CPS) through the inclusion of technology and digital infrastructure.
One of the core components of the transportation CPS (TCPS) is connected and
automated vehicles (CAV). Advancement in vehicular network technologies and vehicle
automation is an important factor in the evolution of CAVs. Improving the security of invehicle networks and automated vehicle applications, and reliability of vehicle-toeverything (V2X) communication are critical areas that need further attention from the
research community. In this dissertation, the author demonstrates methods and models to
improve the security and reliability of CAV communication and applications under
different scenarios using state-of-the-art technologies, such as software-defined
networking, artificial intelligence, and edge computing.
This dissertation is composed of three interrelated articles. The first article
demonstrates the development of an anomaly detection model for the in-vehicle
controller area network (CAN) of a vehicle. The model is tested for two real-vehicle
CAN datasets for two different types of anomalies. The results show improvement in
detection accuracy over baseline models. In the second article, an edge-centric handover
management system is developed for the internet of vehicles. The system architecture is
based on multiple layers of edge devices and distributed computation for managing the
handover of CAVs. The system uses a deep learning model for predicting the future
movement of vehicles and software-defined networking for implementing the handover
of connected vehicles. Analysis shows that an edge-centric handover system is superior
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to a decentralized individual handover system for handover latency, communication
delay, packet loss, and throughput. The third article focuses on the security of automated
vehicle applications. This article presents a hybrid defense method that protects deep
learning models for traffic sign classification against adversarial attacks. This method
uses random filtering, ensembling, and local feature mapping to improve the resilience of
the classifier. Analysis shows that this defense method improves upon baseline defense
strategies in making the model resilient against different types of adversarial attacks and
demonstrates its general applicability for any future adversarial attacks against traffic
sign classifiers.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
The security and reliability of connected and automated vehicle communication
and applications is a significant area of research in the domain of transportation CyberPhysical Systems (CPS). In-vehicle networks are vulnerable to different types of
cyberattacks, which may compromise vehicle safety. The communication between
vehicles and the outside world needs to be reliable, such as low packet loss and low delay
for running safety and mobility applications reliably in vehicles and in the supporting
digital infrastructure. Finally, the automated vehicle applications need to be secured for
safe operation of autonomous vehicles on the roadway. These issues have been addressed
in this dissertation.
Today’s vehicles contain many electronic control units (ECUs) communicating
with each other within the in-vehicle network, such as controller area network (CAN),
CAN with flexible data-rate (CAN-FD) and Flexray, to ensure vehicle safety and
performance (Charette 2009). The future connected and automated vehicles (CAVs) will
contain many new ECUs, which will be integrated with different sensors and humanmachine interfaces as well as with vehicle-to-everything (V2X) wireless connectivity
through different communication technologies, such as Long-Term Evolution for
Vehicles (LTE-V), 5G, Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi), Dedicated Short Range
Communication (DSRC), and Bluetooth. A vehicle’s interface with the outside
environment increases the risk of attack on its computer systems and communication
networks (Boban et al. 2018). For example, connected vehicles (CVs) are vulnerable
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during over-the-air software updates because the updates may contain malware through
which attackers can compromise the ECUs and gain access to the in-vehicle network
(Miller and Valasek 2015). Failure to detect such injection attacks in real-time on any
safety-critical applications can trigger traffic crashes, which can eventually cause injuries
and death (Takahashi et al. 2018)(Islam et al. 2018). The legacy in-vehicle networks
(LIVN), such as CAN, CAN-FD, and Flexray, efficiently exchange messages between
ECUs in real-time, but they are vulnerable to remotely launched attacks (Woo, Jo and
Lee 2014). In one such attack, the attacker injected corrupted messages within the CAN
bus of a particular vehicle model, thus prompting a recall of 1.4 million vehicles of that
model (Miller and Valasek 2015). Therefore, the risk of corrupted message injection in
CVs and the need for improved detection using emerging technologies remain critically
important (Chowdhury, Islam and Khan 2019). To solve this issue, the author develops
an attack detection model using long short-term memory (LSTM) neural networks due to
its superior performance proved in previous studies for multivariate correlated time series
data (Che et al. 2018). LSTM offers the necessary characteristics to be able to detect
anomalies effectively in time-series data containing longer-term patterns (Malhotra et al.
2015). An LSTM model can capture the long-term useful temporal patterns and drop the
irrelevant patterns, while considering the short-term temporal patterns in the in-vehicle
network data. Therefore, the LSTM model captures the patterns beyond a pre-defined
lookback time window, which is a restricting factor in the traditional time series
classification models (Malhotra et al. 2015).
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Traditional vehicular networking refers to vehicular ad hoc networks (VANET),
where vehicles communicate to form a network of vehicles. This ad hoc approach has
several limitations, such as a lack of processing capability and a lack of global
information. The Internet of Vehicles (IoV) tries to address this issue by integrating other
components into the vehicular network, such as humans (such as the vulnerable road
users), things (i.e., transportation infrastructure), networks, and the environment
(Contreras-Castillo, Zeadally and Guerrero-Ibañez 2017)(Chen et al. 2018). The goal of
IoV is to create an intelligent network where vehicles and additional components, such as
vulnerable road users, roadside devices, and the cloud, aid each other to improve the
computing and communication capabilities supporting different safety and mobility
services (Contreras-Castillo, Zeadally and Guerrero-Ibañez 2017). Therefore, the core of
IoV is vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, where vehicles will connect with
various components of the IoV network, such as traffic signal, roadside sensors, and the
cloud (Chen et al. 2018). To ensure reliable V2X communication in an IoV environment,
a combination of different wireless communication technologies, such as long-term
evolution (LTE), Wi-Fi, and 5G, will be needed. Connected vehicles (CVs) will connect
to different access points (APs) and base stations (BSs) to communicate with the backend
transportation digital infrastructure such as traffic management centers, servers, and the
cloud (Chowdhury et al. 2018). The selection of appropriate radio access technology
(RAT) and handover from one AP/BS to another while moving along a roadway is
critical for reliable and consistent wireless communication between CVs and the
transportation infrastructure (Dey et al. 2016). CVs can perform horizontal handover
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(handoff between APs/BSs using the same wireless communication technology) or
vertical handover (handoff between APs/BSs using different wireless communication
technologies). CVs can take the handover decision locally by scanning for available
AP/BS, measuring the received signal's strength from APs/BSs, and selecting the AP/BS
with the highest signal strength. However, this local approach has several limitations.
First, it does not ensure the load balancing among APs/BSs. For example, many users
may connect to the same AP/BS in a dense usage area, but the bandwidth of an AP/BS is
fixed, leading to delays and dropped packets. Here, load balancing among APs/BSs refers
to optimally distributing the total number of users (i.e., flows) among multiple APs/BSs
so that a single AP/BS is not overloaded, and sufficient bandwidth is available for all
users. Second, handover delay and unnecessary handovers in a short period are critical in
many CV applications, such as stop sign gap assist at intersections and traffic signalvehicle coordination in a signalized corridor. The CV communication can be interrupted
due to unnecessary handovers leading to high delay, packet loss, and degradation of
application quality of service (QoS) (Qiang et al. 2016). There is a need for a global and
proactive approach for RAT selection and handover management for CVs.
Autonomous vehicles (AVs) or self-driving cars is one of the emerging
technologies in the transportation and automotive domain, which has gained significant
attention from academia and industry. A fully autonomous vehicle is envisioned to
navigate through any situation on the road and reach its destination safely (Duarte and
Ratti 2018). A combination of hardware and software is required to achieve the difficult
task of full autonomous driving. AVs contain many different types of software working
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collaboratively to perform various complex tasks in real-time (Chowdhury, Islam and
Khan 2019). The AV software stack can be divided into many parts based on the tasks it
needs to perform, such as perception, localization and mapping, path planning, actuation,
and control (Pendleton et al. 2017). In the perception module, the AV perceives the
environment around it using different sensors such as a camera, LiDAR, Radar, etc. An
example of a perception application is traffic sign recognition. The AV feeds the image
from its camera sensors to a machine learning (ML) or deep learning (DL) classification
model. The ML or DL model classifies the type of traffic sign detected in the image. The
DL model is usually a convolutional neural network (CNN) model, pre-trained on traffic
sign images. If the AV cannot classify traffic signs correctly, it will create a significant
safety issue for the AV. For example, if there is a stop sign and the AV misclassifies it as
a 45-mph speed limit sign, the AV will speed up to 45 mph instead of slowing down and
stopping. This may cause safety issues and accidents for AVs on the road (Chowdhury,
Islam and Khan 2019). The safety and security of AVs have received significant attention
from the research community in recent times. The AVs can be attacked remotely, and the
in-vehicle network that connects the electronic control units can be compromised (Khan
et al. 2020). The vehicle-to-everything connectivity increases the attack surface and
creates opportunities for cyberattacks on the AVs (Chowdhury, Islam and Khan 2019).
Adversarial attacks on input data from the sensors can deceive the DL models and make
them misclassify, so there is a need for an effective defense method against adversarial
attacks to ensure the safe operation of AVs on the road.
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CHAPTER TWO
LONG SHORT-TERM MEMORY NEURAL NETWORK-BASED ATTACK
DETECTION MODEL FOR IN-VEHICLE NETWORK SECURITY

Introduction
In this study, the author creates two types of attacks to investigate in-vehicle
network security; namely, replay attack and amplitude-shift attack. The author uses these
two attacks to create attack datasets from two attack-free in-vehicle controller area
network (CAN) bus datasets (Dataset-I and Dataset-II), which represent a collection of
correlated time series data. The author develops a long short-term memory (LSTM)
neural network-based model for detecting replay attack and amplitude-shift attack. For
attacks on the Dataset-I, the LSTM detection model achieves accuracy of 87.8% and
87.9%, and area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) of 0.63 and 0.88, for replay
attack and amplitude-shift attack, respectively. For attacks on the Dataset-II, the LSTM
detection model achieves accuracy of 83.7% and 83.8%, and AUPRC of 0.53 and 0.75,
for replay attack and amplitude-shift attack, respectively. Overall, the LSTM detection
model shows improvement in accuracy, precision, recall and AUPRC over the baseline
detection models considered in this study.
In previous studies, different types of attacks have been created for in-vehicle
networks. In one study, the authors have explored the fuzzy attack, denial-of-service
(DoS) attack and impersonation attack on the CAN bus (Lee, Jeong and Kim 2017). In
one study, the authors have created five types of attacks on a CAN bus by altering the
sequence of data frames and flipping unused bits in data frames (Taylor, Leblanc and
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Japkowicz 2016). However, these studies do not consider the alteration of the contents of
the data frames of the in-vehicle network. The study aims to address this area of research
by creating two types of attacks that alters the contents of data frames, which are replay
attack and amplitude-shift attack.
Few studies were undertaken to develop CAN bus-based anomaly detection
methods without scanning the data field of the CAN data frames (Ning et al.
2019)(Moore et al. 2017)(Gazdag et al. 2018). These methods rely on external factors,
such as CAN bus signal voltages and inter-signal arrival times at ECUs, to detect attacks.
These models will be unable to detect attacks that only change the contents of the CAN
data frames. Several other studies have explored the use of the data in CAN data frames
for anomaly/intrusion detection (Kang and Kang 2016)(Mo et al. 2019)(Song, Woo and
Kim 2020). These studies have used statistical or machine learning models for anomaly
detection. However, these studies do not investigate the long-term temporal dependencies
and the correlation among different features in the in-vehicle network data for detecting
attacks. The study aims to overcome these research gaps.
The primary contributions of this study are as follows: (i) the author creates two
types of attacks (i.e., replay attack and amplitude-shift attack), and subsequently create
attack datasets from each attack-free CAN bus dataset (Dataset-I and Dataset-II); and (ii)
the author develops an LSTM neural network-based model for detecting replay attack and
amplitude-shift attack within the in-vehicle network and compare the performance of the
model with baseline machine learning-based attack detection models to show its efficacy.
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Dataset Description and Attack Types
To create the attack datasets for developing the detection model, the author uses
two attack-free in-vehicle CAN bus datasets (i.e., Dataset-I and Dataset-II). The DatasetI, containing attack-free CAN data from a KIA soul, was collected by the Hacking and
Countermeasure Research Lab (HCRL) (Lee, Jeong and Kim 2017). They used this
dataset to create attack datasets for DoS, fuzzy and impersonation attacks, but did not
investigate replay attack and amplitude-shift attack in their study. The raw CAN dataset
is decoded using a generic DBC (Database CAN) file for KIA vehicles collected from the
OpenDBC repository (Commaai 2019). The Dataset-I contains the CAN ID (in Hex),
DLC (Data Length Code), DATA and Timestamp (in sec.) fields (see Figure 2.1). The
DBC file contains the scale and offset values to convert the raw bits of data into feature
values. The features contain data from different in-vehicle sensors. Figure 2.1 shows
Dataset-I in raw format, and information available in the DBC file. From the raw data,
the author creates a dataset containing 13 features with 95,200 timesteps (each timestep is
0.1s). The details on the features of Dataset-I are shown in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 Properties of Features in Dataset-I
Feature no.

Feature name

Value range

Correlations

1

TQI_COR_STAT

0.00-3.00

2,3,4,8,9,11,12,13

2

TQI_ACOR

0.00-99.61

1,3,4,8,9,10,11

3

N

0.00-16383.75

1,2,4,5,6,7,8,9,11,13

4

TQI-EMS11

0.00-99.61

1,2,3,8,9,10,11,12

5

TQFR

0.00-99.61

3,6,7,13

8

6

VS

0.00-254.00

3,5,13

7

BRAKE_ACT

0.00-3.00

3,5,13

8

TPS

0.00-104.69

1,2,3,4,9,10,11,12

9

PV_AV_CAN

0.00-99.61

1,2,3,4,8,10,11,12

10

TQI_MIN

0.00-99.61

1,3,8,9,11,12

11

TQI-EMS16

0.00-99.61

1,2,3,4,8,9,10,12

12

TQI_TARGET

0.00-99.61

1,2,4,8,9,10,11

13

TQI_MAX

0.00-99.61

1,3,5,6,7

Figure 2.1 Dataset-I (in raw format) and Generic DBC file for KIA Soul showing the
information for decoding messages of ID 688.
The Dataset-II is a processed CAN bus dataset collected from the AEGIS big data
project repository (Kaiser, Stocker and Festl 2019). The Dataset-II does not require the
pre-processing steps because the feature values have already been extracted from the raw
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CAN bus data. It contains 19 features with 158,659 timesteps (each timestep is 0.1s). The
details of the features of the dataset are shown in Table 2.2.
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC) is used in this study to identify the
correlation among the features within each dataset, following the study by Che et al. (Che
et al. 2018). An absolute value of PCC greater than 0.5 indicates a moderate to strong
correlation among the features in a dataset (Mukaka 2012). A correlation analysis among
the features of a dataset is required to determine if a data-driven anomaly detection model
can be used for attack detection. If there are no correlation among the features, then a
data-driven model will not be able to recognize an anomaly if the feature values are
varying within the usual range. The correlations of each feature in the Dataset-I with
other features of the Dataset-I are included in Table 2.1. Similarly, the correlations of
each feature in the Dataset-II with other features of the Dataset-II are included in Table
2.2.
Table 2.2 Properties of Features in Dataset-II
Feature no.

Feature name

Value range

Correlations

1

AccPedal

0-100

3,5,6,7,13

2

AirIntakeTemperature

12.75-44.25

4,8,12,14,15,16,17,18

3

BoostPressure

0.95-1.72

1,5,6,7,8,13,14,15,16,17,18

4

BrkVoltage

0-1

2,8,12,14,15,16,17,18

5

ENG_Trq_DMD

0-330.64

1,3,6,7,12,13

6

ENG_Trq_ZWR

6-263.19

1,3,5,7,13

7

ENG_Trq_m_ex

0-304

1,3,5,6,7

10

8

EngineSpeed_CAN

676.5-4918.85

2,3,4,12,14,15,16,17,18

9

SCS_01_BZ

0-15

10

10

SCS_01_CHK

16-62.47

9

11

SteerAngle1

0-530.48

19

12

Trq_FrictionLoss

17-53.58

2,4,5,8,14,15,16,17,18

13

Trq_Indicated

0-304

1,3,5,6,7

14

VehicleSpeed

0-141.34

2,3,4,8,12,15,16,17,18

15

WheelSpeed_FL

0-141.45

2,3,4,8,12,14,16,17,18

16

WheelSpeed_FR

0-141.33

2,3,4,8,12,14,15,17,18

17

WheelSpeed_RL

0-141

2,3,4,8,12,14,15,16,18

18

WheelSpeed_RR

0-141.72

2,3,4,8,12,14,15,16,17

19

Yawrate1

0-33.77

11

Two types of attacks are considered in this study, replay attack and amplitudeshift attack. In replay attack, the values of a feature in the in-vehicle network dataset
within a time interval are replaced with the values of the same feature from a randomly
selected past time interval. This simulates the scenario when an ECU is compromised by
malware injection and it sends some previously stored data instead of the current data. In
this scenario, the values are authentic but not relevant to the current context of the ECU’s
functionality.
In amplitude-shift attack, the amplitudes (values) of a feature in the in-vehicle
network dataset are shifted (up or down) by a random value within a time interval,
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meaning a random value (positive or negative) is added to the original values. This
simulates the scenario when an ECU is compromised by malware injection, which alters
the course of ECU execution. As a result, the ECU alters the bits in the data frames by
adding a random shift to the amplitude of a feature. In this attack, although the
amplitudes of a feature changes, the trend of variations over time remains unchanged.
Table 2.3 Details of Attack Dataset Creation

Dataset

DatasetI

DatasetII

No. of
features

Total no.
Attack
type

No. of

of attack

total

on each

attack

feature

labels

total
nonattack
labels

Train

60000

1000

13000

47000

Test

35200

500

6500

28700

Amp.

Train

60000

2000

26000

34000

Shift

Test

35200

1000

13000

22200

Train

95000

1000

19000

76000

Test

63659

750

14250

49409

Amp.

Train

95000

2000

38000

57000

Shift

Test

63659

1000

19000

44659

Replay
19

of
timesteps

Replay
13

Train/Test

Timesteps

No. of

12

The author uses these two attacks to create attack datasets from two attack-free
CAN bus datasets (Dataset-I and Dataset-II), where each timestep equals 0.1s. The details
on the attack datasets created from Dataset-I and Dataset-II are given in Table 2.3. Training
and testing datasets contain compromised data from each feature. When the data of one
feature is compromised, data from other features remain unchanged. Replay attack changes
the trend of variation over time for features, such as torque frequency (TQFR) (Figure
2.2(a)) and engine speed (EngineSpeed_CAN) (Figure 2.3(a)). Amplitude-shift attack
shifts the amplitude down for some features, such as TQFR (Figure 2.2(b)) and up for some
features, such as EngineSpeed_CAN (Figure 2.3(b)). The detection model will be
evaluated for all attack datasets to test its effectiveness in different contexts and verify its
transferability.

(a)
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(b)
Figure 2.2 Attack on torque frequency signal in Dataset-I: (a) Replay attack; and (b)
Amplitude-shift attack. Each timestep equals 0.1s.

(a)
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(b)
Figure 2.3 Attack on engine speed signal in Dataset-II: (a) Replay attack; and (b)
Amplitude-shift attack. Each timestep equals 0.1s.

LSTM Attack Detection Model
An LSTM model is developed for attack detection because it can capture the
long-term temporal patterns in a time series data. LSTM cells contain cell-state, which
acts as the memory that keeps track of the previous instances and forget gate, which
determines the information that can be dropped from the memory (cell-state). Forget gate
and cell-state together preserve the long-term dependencies of future instances on past
instances, thus solving the vanishing gradient problem (continuously decreasing gradients
in back propagation step, which prevents the model from learning during the training
phase) (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber 1997). As a result, the model can detect anomalies
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in the in-vehicle network data by capturing the long-term temporal patterns in the attackfree data as well as the correlations among different features in the in-vehicle network
data. These are the major motivations to develop the LSTM model for attack detection in
this study.
The attack detection model architecture consists of an LSTM layer with 512
LSTM neurons (LSTM-512) followed by a fully-connected (FC) layer with 8 neurons
(FC-8) and the output layer as shown in Figure 2.4. All hidden layers use rectified linear
units (ReLU) and the output layer uses the sigmoid function as the activation functions.
The binary cross-entropy function (BCE) is used as the loss function for training the
model, as shown in Equation (2.1) (Song, Woo and Kim 2020).
𝑁

1
𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 = − ∑ (𝑦𝑛 log(𝑝(𝑦𝑛 )) + (1 − 𝑦𝑛 ) log(1 − 𝑝(𝑦𝑛 )))
𝑁

(2.1)

𝑛=1

where, N is the number of instances, yn = 0 (non-attack label) or 1 (attack label)
and p(yn) is the predicted probability of the instance n belonging to class 1. The optimizer
used is the Adamax optimizer with low learning rates because the LSTM detection model
faces overfitting issues during the latter stages of training (Kingma and Ba 2014).
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Figure 2.4 LSTM neural network architecture for attack detection.
Table 2.4 Baseline Model Parameters
Models

Parameters

KNN

Number of neighbors = 5, distance = “Euclidian”

SVM

C = 16, gamma = 1/Number of features, kernel = “RBF”

RF

Number of trees = 500

Naïve Bayes

Distribution = “Gaussian”

XGBoost

Booster = “Gradient-based tree”

The LSTM detection model is compared with six other baseline detection models,
which are K-nearest neighbor (KNN), support vector machine (SVM), random forest
(RF), naïve bayes (NB), XGBoost and multilayer perceptron (MLP) neural network. The
selected baseline models are machine learning models that have been used in previous
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studies for in-vehicle network anomaly detection (Gazdag et al. 2018) (Kang and Kang
2016)(Mo et al. 2019)(Song, Woo and Kim 2020). The parameters used for these models
(except MLP) are listed in Table 2.4. The hyperparameters of the MLP and the LSTM
model are listed in Table 2.5. These represent the combination of parameters that yield
the highest attack detection accuracy on all attack datasets. Different numbers of epoch
(300, 500, and 1000), batch size (128, 512, and 1024), neurons in LSTM layer (64, 128,
256, 512, and 1024), neurons in FC layer (4, 8, 16, and 32) and learning rate (0.002,
0.001, and 0.0005) are used to run the LSTM model and identify the best combination of
hyperparameters.
Table 2.5 MLP and LSTM Hyperparameters
Hyperparameters

MLP

LSTM

Number of epochs

500

300

Number of neurons

512, 8, 1

512, 8, 1

Batch size

512

512

Optimizer

Adamax

Adamax

Learning Rate

0.001

0.001

Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 represent the comparison of the LSTM detection model
with baseline detection models for all attack datasets created from the Dataset-I and
Dataset-II, respectively. The models are arranged in sequence based on their overall
performance for each type of attack. The accuracy, precision and recall are calculated
using the confusion matrix generated from each model considering equal class weights,
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following the BCE function in Equation 2.1. All binary classification metrics are
calculated using four prediction measures, true positive (TP), false positive (FP), true
negative (TN), and false negative (FN). The formula for accuracy, precision, and recall
are given in equations 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4
𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =

𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁

(2.2)

𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃

(2.3)

𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 =

𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁

(2.4)

The author also reports the area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) in
Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 to compare the performance of the models for different
classification thresholds (0-1) (Huch et al. 2018). The LSTM, MLP and RF models were
run 50 times and the average accuracy, precision, recall and AUPRC were taken due to
the stochasticity of these models. From Table 2.6 and 2.7, it can be concluded that the
LSTM detection model is the best performing model as it achieves the highest accuracy,
precision and AUPRC value for all attack datasets. The precision-recall curve of different
models for amplitude-shift attack on the Dataset-II is shown in Figure 2.5 as an example,
which clearly demonstrates the superior performance of the LSTM detection model
compared to baseline detection models.
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Figure 2.5 Precision-recall curve for amplitude-shift attack on Dataset-II
For attacks on the Dataset-I, the LSTM detection model achieves accuracy of
87.8% and 87.9%, and AUPRC of 0.63 and 0.88, for replay attack and amplitude-shift
attack, respectively. For attacks on the Dataset-II, the LSTM detection model achieves
accuracy of 83.7% and 83.8%, and AUPRC of 0.53 and 0.75, for replay attack and
amplitude-shift attack, respectively. Overall, MLP is the best performing model among
the baseline detection models. For replay attack, the LSTM detection model achieves an
average improvement of 1.4% in accuracy and 3.3% in AUPRC over the MLP model.
For amplitude-shift attack, the LSTM detection model achieves an average improvement
of 5.1% in accuracy and 10.4% in AUPRC over the MLP model. The LSTM model has a
lower recall than the SVM model for replay attack on the Dataset-II as SVM achieves
less false negatives at the cost of more false positives. Based on the performance for all
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attack datasets considered in this study, the author can conclude that overall the LSTM
detection model performs better than the baseline detection models.
Conclusions
In this study, the author creates two types of attacks to investigate in-vehicle
network security; namely, replay attack and amplitude-shift attack. The author uses these
two attacks to create attack datasets from two attack-free in-vehicle controller area
network (CAN) bus datasets (Dataset-I and Dataset-II), which represent a collection of
correlated time series data. The author develops a long short-term memory (LSTM)
neural network-based model for detecting replay attack and amplitude-shift attack. For
attacks on the Dataset-I, the LSTM detection model achieves accuracy of 87.8% and
87.9%, and area under the precision-recall curve (AUPRC) of 0.63 and 0.88, for replay
attack and amplitude-shift attack, respectively. For attacks on the Dataset-II, the LSTM
detection model achieves accuracy of 83.7% and 83.8%, and AUPRC of 0.53 and 0.75,
for replay attack and amplitude-shift attack, respectively. Overall, the LSTM detection
model shows improvement in accuracy, precision, recall and AUPRC over the baseline
detection models considered in this study.
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CHAPTER THREE
EDGE-CENTRIC HANDOVER MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR CONNECTED
VEHICLES IN HETEROGENEOUS WIRELESS NETWORKS
Introduction
This study focuses on developing an edge-centric handover (ECHO) management
system for connected vehicles (CVs) in heterogeneous wireless networks (Wi-Fi and
LTE). First, the author develops a radio access technology (RAT) selection model, which
can be deployed on a fixed edge node to determine the Wi-Fi access point (AP) or LTE
base station (BS) association for all CVs. The RAT selection model consists of a stacked
long-short-term memory (LSTM) model for predicting the positions of CVs and an
integer programming optimizer for RAT selection of CVs. The author also develops an
edge-centric handover management system based on software-defined networking and
the RAT selection model. Fixed edge nodes generate and send handover requests to
respective CVs, and these CVs perform the handover (vertical or horizontal) accordingly.
To evaluate the ECHO system, the author uses OpenNet, a combined Mininet-ns3
simulator, and a case study. The author creates two variations of the ECHO system and
compare the two systems with a baseline system: the decentralized handover (DHO)
management system. The simulation analyses in OpenNet show that the ECHO system
reduces the average handover latency per CV by 51%, while distributing the load among
the available APs/BSs and reducing the average load on BSs/APs by 6%, compared to the
DHO system.
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Background
In this study, the author develops an edge-centric handover (ECHO) system for
managing the handover of CVs in a heterogeneous wireless network (Hetnet)
environment. Edge-centric handover management refers to the use of edge computing for
managing the handovers of CVs. CVs perform many vertical and horizontal handovers in
real-time for different V2X applications. Each CV performing its handover is a greedy
method that causes many communication issues such as higher packet loss and delays.
Utilizing edge computing can improve overall system performance by addressing the two
major problems described in the previous paragraph, load balancing and unnecessary
handovers in a short period. Software-defined networking (SDN) technology is
incorporated into the ECHO system for network management. In SDN, the control plane
is separated from the data plane, so it is used for controlling the data flow in the ECHO
system (Truong, Lee and Ghamri-Doudane 2015) As part of the ECHO system, the
author develops a radio access technology (RAT) selection model for CVs based on a
multi-step prediction model and an integer programming problem. The RAT selection
model framework is derived from the model predictive controller concept, which uses a
prediction model and an optimization model to design robust control strategies by
considering delays and high mobility of dynamic systems, which is particularly useful for
CVs (Camacho and Alba 2013).
Contribution of this Study
The contribution of the study is twofold. First, to the best of the knowledge, this is
the first study that develops a RAT selection model that uses the concept of the model-
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predictive controller to simultaneously solve two networking problems, which are load
balancing among APs/BSs and removing unnecessary handovers in a short period. As
part of this model, the author develops a multi-step CV position prediction model using
long short-term memory (LSTM) neural networks, which is combined with an integer
programming problem to select the best AP/BS association strategy for CVs that achieve
the two goals. Second, the authors develop the ECHO system, a multi-layered edgecentric handover management system for CVs in a Hetnet environment that incorporates
the RAT selection model.
To validate the efficacy of the ECHO system, the author conducts a case study
and compare the performance of the system with a baseline system called the
decentralized handover management (DHO) system, which is the de-facto handover
management system for mobile nodes (Qiang et al. 2016)(Aljeri and Boukerche 2019). In
the DHO system, each CV continues to scan for available AP/BS, measures the received
signal strength indicator (RSSI) value with all available AP/BS, and associates with the
AP/BS having the highest RSSI value (Larasari et al. 2017). Additionally, the author
created two variations of the ECHO system, which are ECHO-O and ECHO-OP. In the
ECHO-O system, only the integer programming problem is solved for RAT selection,
and the multi-step prediction model is not considered. In the ECHO-OP system, the
integer programming problem is solved, and the multi-step prediction model is
considered for RAT selection. These two variations are used to identify any improvement
from the prediction model.
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Related Works
Previous research on CV handover management has several limitations, which the
author addressed in this study. Qiang et al. presented a global network selection and
vertical handoff scheme for CVs in heterogeneous wireless networks using SDN (Qiang
et al. 2016). Raschella et al. presented a QoS-aware RAT selection for software-defined
heterogeneous wireless networks, which introduces the fittingness factor (FF) for
considering the QoS of downlink data flow (Raschella et al. 2017). Both studies consider
a global handover management system. However, they do not address unnecessary
handovers in a short period for mobile node communication. Aljeri and Boukerche
presented a two-tier machine learning algorithm for handover management of CVs using
a recurrent neural network model and a stochastic Markov model (Aljeri and Boukerche
2019). As the authors have developed a local handover management system, they do not
consider load balancing or network performance (e.g., delay, packet loss) in the handover
decision-making. Their network is homogeneous, where only IEEE 802.11p
communication standard is considered. Several other studies have focused on the RAT
selection and handover in wireless networks (Wang et al. 2018)(Lemic et al.
2019)(Nahida et al. 2017)(Walid et al. 2016)(Alotaibi and Alwakeel 2015). For example,
in one study, the authors demonstrate deep reinforcement learning (RL) for horizontal
handover control in a homogeneous wireless system (Wang et al. 2018). This study
develops a centralized global system for clustering CVs based on their mobility patterns.
Then, they develop RL models for each cluster, and the vehicles in the clusters use the
RL model for exploring and finding an optimal handover strategy. Although the RL
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model for each cluster is maintained globally, each CV uses it for its handover
management without considering the effect on the network. Thus, their system can be
viewed as a hybrid system that does not address load balancing and unnecessary
handovers quickly. In another study, the authors presented a location-based vertical
handover strategy for low power wide area networks (Wang et al. 2018). However, this
approach is a local one based on the signal-to-noise ratio, which does not consider the
network's load balancing.
ECHO System Architecture
Figure 3.1 shows the architecture of the ECHO system. The ECHO system can be
divided into different geographical zones. Each zone is autonomous and has its own
centralized handover management system. This section describes the details of each
geographical zone consisting of three layers: mobile edge layer, lower fixed edge layer,
and upper fixed edge layer. Each layer, its components, and associated applications are
described below.
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Figure 3.1 ECHO system architecture for CV handover management.
Layer 1: Mobile Edge Layer
The mobile edge layer consists of the mobile edge nodes, which in this case, are
CVs. Each CV has a processing unit that runs two applications: broadcasting basic safety
messages (BSM) and handover from one AP/BS to another. The BSM data packets
contain the basic information about the CV's status, such as its current position, speed,
acceleration, and heading. The BSM data sending application creates the BSM data
packets and sends the data packets to the lower fixed edge node. The handover
application continues to listen for handover request data packets. As soon as it receives a
handover request packet, it extracts information about the new AP/BS, disassociates with
its current AP/BS, and initiates the association process with the new AP/BS.

27

Layer 2: Lower Fixed Edge Layer
The lower fixed edge layer contains the Wi-Fi APs and LTE BSs. Each Wi-Fi AP
and LTE BS are Openflow-enabled, which means they are equipped with Open vSwitch
kernels, so an SDN controller can send control messages to the APs and BSs (Pfaff et al.
2015). The difference with traditional AP/BS is that an Openflow-enabled AP/BS can
forward/receive data packets based on the Openflow protocol-based control messages
received from an SDN controller. The lower fixed edge node contains the SDN controller
to send control instructions to the APs and BSs. The lower fixed edge nodes also contain
the handover request generator application. This application receives the RAT selection
from the upper edge node and matches this data with its current association status (i.e., ID
of associated CVs). If it finds a mismatch, then the application sends handover requests to
the CVs, which need to disassociate with the current AP/BS. The handover request
packet also contains the information required for associating with the new AP/BS, such
as ID, service type, and password. The author has assumed that a CV can associate with
any AP/BS using only the ID information in this study. The SDN controller sends control
messages to the AP/BS. The AP/BS forward the handover request packets to the
appropriate CVs. As the data is originating from the lower fixed edge node, the packet-in
port is fixed. However, the SDN controller will assign a port for packet-out based on the
CV ID, as each CV is assigned a port in the Openflow-enabled AP/BS. The SDN
controller will update the flow table with the new flow information, and the AP/BS will
start forwarding the data to the respective CV. Similarly, the SDN controller controls the
BSM data flow from CVs to the lower fixed edge node. The lower fixed edge node
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receives the BSM data and forwards it to the upper fixed edge node using a wired
Ethernet connection. AP/BS.
Layer 3: Upper Fixed Edge Layer
The upper fixed edge layer contains only one node, the upper fixed edge node.
This node runs two applications. The first is the RAT selection application. This
application receives the BSM data from all CVs within its zone through the lower fixed
edge nodes. Then, it determines the RAT selection for all CVs. After that, it sends a copy
of the RAT selection back to all lower fixed edge nodes. The upper fixed edge node also
exchanges zonal information with other upper fixed edge nodes in adjacent zones using a
wired Ethernet connection.
RAT Selection Model
The RAT selection model resides in the upper fixed edge layer. The model has
two components: (i) a stacked LSTM model for multi-step prediction of CV positions and
(ii) an integer programming problem to find the optimal AP/BS selection for all CVs.
Below is a list of all the notations used in describing the RAT selection model.
𝑚 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑉𝑠;
𝑛 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐴𝑃/𝐵𝑆;
𝑞 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑤;
𝐶𝑉 = {𝑐𝑣𝑖 } = 𝑆𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑉𝑠 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑚;
𝐴𝑃 = {𝑎𝑝𝑗 } = 𝑆𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠/ 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑗 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑛;
𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑣𝑖 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑝𝑗 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡;
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𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡ℎ = 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛;
𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖0𝑗 = 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑝𝑗 𝑎𝑡 𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
𝑠𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑝𝑗 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑣𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 (𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠),
𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑣𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑗 ;
𝑔𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑎𝑝𝑗 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑣𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 (𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠),
𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑣𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑗 ;
𝑑𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑒𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑣𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑝𝑗 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡;
ℎ𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝑓𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 (𝑐𝑣𝑖 , 𝑎𝑝𝑗 );
𝛼 = 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡;
𝑡𝑝𝑗 = 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑝𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 (𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠);
𝑏𝑤𝑗 = 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑗 (𝑀𝐻𝑧);
𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑗 = 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑎𝑝𝑗 ;
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 (𝑐𝑣𝑖 , 𝑎𝑝𝑗 ) 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 (𝑀𝑏𝑝𝑠)
𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) =
𝐴𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒 𝐺𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑛𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑙 (𝑐𝑣𝑖 , 𝑎𝑝𝑗 ) 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡 (𝑊𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑠);
𝛽𝑖 = 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑤𝑖𝑑𝑡ℎ 𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑣𝑖 (𝑀𝑏𝑝𝑠);
𝑝𝑖 (𝑡) = [𝑝𝑥𝑖 (𝑡), 𝑝𝑦𝑖 (𝑡)] = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑣𝑖 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡; 𝑎𝑛𝑑
′
′
] = 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑝𝑗
𝑝𝑗′ = [𝑝𝑥𝑗
, 𝑝𝑦𝑗

The architecture of the multi-step predictive model is specific to the case study, so
the model architecture is described later. Here the author will expand on the integer
programming problem for RAT selection.
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Using the multi-step prediction model, the author gets the future positions of a
CV, pi(t+1), pi(t+2), pi(t+3),…, pi(t+q). The Euclidian distance between each CV and
each AP/BS is calculated (i.e., dij(t+1), dij(t+2), dij(t+3),..., dij(t+q)) using the predicted
positions. These predicted distances can be used to predict the RSSI values (i.e.,
rssiij(t+1), rssiij(t+2),…,rssiij(t+q)) using (3.1).
𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖0𝑗 − 10𝛼 𝑙𝑜𝑔10 𝑑𝑖𝑗 (𝑡)

(3.1)

Let us assume that at time t, each connected vehicle (cvi) runs a mobility
application with a specific bandwidth requirement on the downlink and is connected to a
specific AP/BS (apj) within its range. The author also assumes that m number of CVs are
connected to n number of APs/BSs, where each CV (cvi) is connected to one AP/BS
(apj). Now, let us consider that cvi is connected to apj at time t. The received signal power
can be determined using (3.2) (Rappaport 2002).
𝑠𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝑡𝑝𝑗 ℎ𝑖𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗 (𝑡)−𝛼

(3.2)

The received signal power from all other APs for cvi can be considered as
interference signals. The signal power for interference can be calculated using (3.3)
(Andrews, Baccelli and Ganti 2011).
𝑔𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝑡𝑝𝑗 ℎ𝑖𝑗 𝑑𝑖𝑗 (𝑡)−𝛼

(3.3)

The Shannon–Hartley theorem can be used to determine the channel capacity of
(cvi, apj) in the presence of noise using sij(t) and gij(t), as shown in (3.4) (Shannon 2001).
𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 𝑏𝑤𝑗 𝑙𝑜𝑔2 [1 +

𝑠𝑖𝑗 (𝑡)
𝑛,𝑥≠𝑗
∑𝑥=1 𝑔𝑖𝑥 (𝑡) +

𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑗 (𝑡)
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]

(3.4)

Then, ccij(t) can be used to derive the utilization factor for each channel. The
channel utilization factor (FF) relates the available channel capacity and the required
bandwidth. It has a high value when the channel is fully utilized, and it has a low value if
the channel is underutilized or the bandwidth requirement exceeds the channel capacity
(Raschella et al. 2017). The range of values is 0 to 1. The formula for channel utilization
factor for the channel (cvi, apj) is given in (3.5).

𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) =

1−𝑒

𝛺𝑖𝑗 (𝑡)×𝛽𝑖
−
𝜌×𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑗(𝑡)

Where, 𝛺𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) =

(3.5)

𝜆
(

𝜌×𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑗(𝑡) 𝜍
𝛽𝑖

)

𝜌×𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑗(𝑡) 𝜍

1+(

𝛽𝑖

1
1
1−𝜍
(𝜍−1) 𝜍 +(𝜍−1) 𝜍

−

,𝜆 =1−𝑒

)

Here, Ωi,j(t) is a sigmoid-based utility function, which is used to denote the
achievable bit rate between channel (cvi, apj). The λ function is used to ensure that the
value of ffij(t) is not able to surpass 1. The parameters ζ and ρ are used to represent the
different degrees of elasticity between ccij(t) and βi (t).
The association matrix, A(t), defines the current state of association between each
CV and each AP/BS, as shown in (3.6).
𝑎11 (𝑡) 𝑎12 (𝑡) … 𝑎1𝑛 (𝑡)
𝑎21 (𝑡) 𝑎22 (𝑡) … 𝑎2𝑛 (𝑡)
.
.
.
𝐴 (𝑡 ) =
.
.
.
.
.
.
(𝑎𝑚1 (𝑡) 𝑎𝑚2 (𝑡) … 𝑎𝑚𝑛 (𝑡))

(3.6)

1, 𝑖𝑓 𝑐𝑣𝑖 𝑖𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑝𝑗 𝑎𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑡
}
Where, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = {
0, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒

32

Using the predicted Euclidian distance between the CVs and APs/BSs (i.e.
dij(t+1), dij(t+2), dij(t+3),..., dij(t+q)) from the multi-step prediction model, the future
RSSI and FF values for each CV and AP/BS pair can be calculated using (3.1) and (3.5),
respectively. The author considers several factors in designing the integer programming
model for AP/BS selection. The objective function has three terms, the first two terms are
maximization terms and the third term is a minimization term. Term 1, term 2, and term 3
represent the sum of the signal strength of all CVs, the sum of the channel utilization
factor of all CVs, and the maximum load on any AP/BS, respectively. Each term is
normalized between 0 and 1, because the author knows the minimum and maximum
values of signal strengths, channel utilization factors, and maximum AP/BS load. Using
the optimization model, the author wants to ensure that the CVs connect to the AP/BS
with the highest signal strength (term 1) while CV application bandwidth requirements
are fulfilled, and AP/BS channel utility is maximized (term 2), but the maximum load on
APs/BSs is minimized (term 3). The optimization is performed for each future timestep
separately.
𝑛
𝑚
𝑛
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑧𝑒 [∑𝑚
𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡 ) 𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗 (𝑡 ) + ∑𝑖=1 ∑𝑗=1 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡 ) 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗 (𝑡 ) −

𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∑𝑚
𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡 )] , ∀𝑡 = 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2, … , 𝑡 + 𝑞
𝑗

Subject to,
∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 1; ∀𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑚; ∀𝑡 = 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2, … , 𝑡 + 𝑞

(3.7)

∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡)𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) ≥ 𝛽𝑖 ; ∀𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑚; ∀𝑡 = 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2, … , 𝑡 + 𝑞

(3.8)

∑𝑚
𝑖=1 𝛽𝑖 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) ≤ 𝑏𝑤𝑗 𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑗 ; ∀𝑗 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑛; ∀𝑡 = 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2, … , 𝑡 + 𝑞

(3.9)
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𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) = 1; ∀𝑖, 𝑗 𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑗 (𝑡 − 1) ≥ 𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑡ℎ ; ∀𝑡 = 𝑡, 𝑡 + 1, 𝑡 + 2, . . . , 𝑡 + 𝑞

(3.10)

0 ≤ 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) ≤ 1, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 (𝑡) are integers; ∀𝑖 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑚; ∀𝑗 = 1,2,3, … , 𝑛; ∀𝑡 = 𝑡, 𝑡 +
(3.11)

1, 𝑡 + 2, . . . , 𝑡 + 𝑞

There are five constraints in this optimization problem, as indicated in (3.7)(3.11). Equation (3.7) ensures that one CV is connected to only one AP/BS. Equation
(3.8) confirms that the channel capacity provided by the selected AP/BS meets the CV’s
bandwidth requirement. The purpose of Equation (3.9) is to make sure that the AP/BS
load is less than or equal to its total bandwidth capacity. Equation (3.10) ensures that a
CV with reliable communication with its currently associated AP/BS (as defined by the
RSSI threshold value), will remain connected to that AP/BS. The association matrix
elements need to be Boolean (0 or 1), as shown in (3.11). By solving the optimization
problem, the author obtains the optimized association matrices for the current timestep,
A(t), and future timesteps within the prediction time window, A(t+1), A(t+2),…, A(t+q).
Let us examine how the lower fixed edge node generates a handover request for a
particular CV from the overall RAT selection data. For each CV, the RAT selection is
extracted for all current and future timesteps. Then, a plurality voting system is used to
select one AP/BS from all the timesteps. In the plurality voting system, the selection
depends on the highest number of votes (Lin et al. 2003). Each future timestep gets an
equal vote on the current AP/BS selection. The AP/BS with the highest vote is selected as
the AP/BS for the CV. In the case of a tie, one AP/BS is chosen randomly from the
winners. Thus, the author gets the RAT selection data for all CVs. The RAT selection
data is sent to all lower fixed edge nodes. If a CV is connected to an AP/BS and is
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required to make a handover to another AP/BS, then a lower edge node generates a
handover request and forwards it to the CV through the AP/BS. (Figure 3.1). After the
CV receives the handover request packet containing the AP/BS information (AP/BS ID in
this research), the CV starts the handover process.
Experimental Setup
To test the efficacy of the ECHO system, a network simulation platform is
required that can simulate fixed edge nodes, mobile edge nodes, heterogeneous wireless
networks (i.e., Wi-Fi, LTE), and SDN controllers. The author has used OpenNet (Chan et
al. 2014), a simulator that combines two other known simulators, Mininet (De Oliveira
2014) and ns3 (Riley and Henderson 2010). Mininet is used for simulating the Ethernet
connections and integration with SDN controllers for lower fixed edge nodes (De
Oliveira 2014). At the same time, ns3 is required for simulating the wireless networks
and mobility model for mobile edge nodes (Riley and Henderson 2010). The author has
used the Ryu SDN controller in Mininet to send control messages from the lower edge
nodes to the Wi-Fi APs and LTE BSs (Khondoker et al. 2014). Ryu controller provides
an application layer where Python scripts can be deployed to send control messages to
Mininet nodes (Khondoker et al. 2014).
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(a)

(b)
Figure 3.2 (a) Mininet-ns3 integration using TapBridge, (b) OSI Layers in WiFi and
LTE and corresponding simulation platforms
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Figure 3.2(a) shows how two separate simulators, Mininet and ns3, are combined
to simulate the wireless network containing mobile edge nodes, Wi-Fi APs and LTE BSs.
The interface is created using a technology in ns3 called TapBridge. TapBridge can be
used to include actual physical nodes (hosts) in ns3 simulation in Linux machines.
However, in this study, the real nodes are replaced by Mininet nodes. Figure 3.2(a) shows
that Mininet nodes can interact with the Linux network stack, which provides a Tap
interface. This Tap interface can connect with a TapBridge created in the ns3 simulator.
In ns3, a TapBridge can connect directly to an ns3 net device. Two net devices can be
connected via a channel model is ns3. This channel model can contain all the realistic
characteristics such as spectrum and interference. This ns3 channel is part of the ns3
process that will run in the root namespace in the Linux Kernel. As a result, two nodes
created and configured in Mininet can be connected via a realistic channel model in ns3.
Now, let us examine how this technology can be used to simulate Wi-Fi and LTE
networks. In OpenNet, the Wi-Fi network is already implemented using the
“WifiSegment” function, which creates the Wi-Fi network in ns3, adds stations (CVs or
mobile nodes) and APs, and creates a link with Mininet using TapBridge technology.
This function creates a Wi-Fi channel based on the log distance propagation loss model,
the default path loss model in ns3 for Wi-Fi networks (Benin, Nowatkowski and Owen
2012). The log-distance path loss model can be expressed using (3.12).
𝑃𝐿𝑊𝑖𝐹𝑖 (𝑑 ) = 𝑃𝐿𝑊𝑖𝐹𝑖 (𝑑0 ) + 10𝛼 log10 (

𝑑
)+𝜒
𝑑0

(3.12)

Here, PL(d) is the path loss at distance d from the Wi-Fi AP. PL(d0) is the path
loss at a reference distance d0. α is the path loss exponent, which increases the path loss
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based on the environment's noise. χ is a random normal variable with zero-mean that
models the shadowing effect. The shadowing effect refers the path loss associated with
fluctuations in received signal power because of obstructions between the transmitter and
receiver. Shadowing can be considered as one type of fading, where the received signal
fluctuations are experienced on short-term average received signal power. In the
shadowing effect, there is usually a large obstruction, such as a hill or a large building,
between the transmitter and the receiver, which affects the signal power and increases the
path loss. The most popular model for shadowing is the log-normal shadowing model,
which is represented here using the χ variable. In this study, the author has not considered
obstructions in the simulation scenario design for the case study, so χ is set to zero in this
study.
From Figure 3.2(b), the author observes the difference between the Wi-Fi and
LTE OSI layers. In order to simulate an LTE network in a similar way, the author created
an “LTESegment” function, which creates an LTE network in a similar way to the
“WifiSegment” function. This function adds LTE mobile nodes and LTE base stations to
the network. Below the IP Layer, the LTE has the packet data convergence protocol
(PDCP) layer, radio link control (RLC) layer, MAC layer, and PHY layer. In ns3, the
LENA module already has an implementation of the LTE stack (Baldo 2011). However,
the channel model needs to be created for ns3 based on the 3GPP standards. In the 3GPP
TR 37.885 document, an evaluation of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) use cases for LTE
have been included (Wang, Mao and Gong 2017). This document refers to the TR 38.901
document, which includes the channel model from 0.5 to 100 GHz (Wang, Mao and
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Gong 2017). Based on these two documents, the author has identified the path loss model
for the LTE channel. The equation for the 3GPP path loss model is given in (3.13),
(3.14), and (3.15).
𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑇𝐸 = {

𝑃𝐿1 , 10𝑚 ≤ 𝑑2𝐷 ≤ 𝑑 ′ 𝐵𝑃
}
𝑃𝐿2 , 𝑑 ′ 𝐵𝑃 ≤ 𝑑2𝐷 ≤ 5000𝑚

(3.13)

𝑃𝐿1 = 28.0 + 22 log10 𝑑3𝐷 + 20 log10 𝑓𝑐

(3.14)

𝑃𝐿2 = 28.0 + 40 log10 𝑑3𝐷 + 20 log10 𝑓𝑐 − 9 log10 [(𝑑 ′ 𝐵𝑃 )2 + (ℎ𝐵𝑆 − ℎ𝑈𝑇 )2 ]

(3.15)

Here, d2D and d3D are the 2D and 3D distances between the LTE mobile node and
LTE BS, respectively. fc is the operating frequency of the LTE network in Hz. hBS and
hUT are the actual heights of the antenna of the base station and mobile node, respectively.
hBS is fixed according to the 3GPP document at 25m. hUT can vary between 1.5m and
22.5m. Finally, d’BP is the breakpoint distance, which can be computed using (3.16).
𝑑′𝐵𝑃 = 4ℎ′ 𝐵𝑆 ℎ′ 𝑈𝑇 𝑓𝑐 /𝑐

(3.16)

Where h’BS and h’UT are the effective heights of the base station antenna and
mobile node antenna compared to the reference height of the environment. c is the speed
of light. The interference between the different channels is modeled using the
“SpectrumInterferenceHelper” function in ns3. This function adds Gaussian noise to
signals overlapping during the simulation.
Using the “WifiSegment” function and the “LTESegment” function, the author
creates a simulation scenario with two networks, and the author adds mobile nodes
(CVs), APs to the Wi-Fi network, and BSs to the LTE network.
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Figure 3.3 1000m×1000m Road Network in SUMO
Case Study and Findings
Using the simulator setup described in the previous section, the author creates a
case study to evaluate the performance of the ECHO system. At first, the nodes in
Mininet and ns3 require a mobility model to simulate the movement patterns of CVs. The
author creates a 1000m×1000m road network using a traffic micro simulation software
named simulation of urban mobility (SUMO) (Behrisch et al. 2011). Using this road
network in SUMO (Figure 3.3), The author creates many traffic scenarios with different
numbers of vehicles to simulate different types of traffic conditions, such as free flow,
mild congestion, and high congestion. Each scenario is simulated for one hour, and the
vehicle positions are collected. These datasets are combined to create the training and
testing dataset for the multi-step position prediction model. Moreover, the author creates
three scenarios with a varying number of CVs, which are termed as S1 (CV=20), S2
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(CV=50), and S3 (CV=100), and collect the vehicle positions for these three scenarios.
These three datasets are used as the mobility model in Mininet and ns3. The CV positions
over time are stored from SUMO using trace files. The author combines this trace file and
the waypoint following mobility model in ns3 to replicate the CV mobility from SUMO
in a 1000m×1000m region in Mininet and ns3. Each scenario (S1, S2 and S3) contains 9
Wi-Fi APs (“ap1, ap2, …, ap9” ) and 4 LTE BSs (“bs1, bs2, bs3, bs4”) in a
1000m×1000m region. The simulation model contains many parameters; their names and
values are given in Table 3.1.

Figure 3.4 Stacked LSTM model architecture
Table 3.1 Simulation Parameters
Parameters

Values

Simulation spatial dimension

1000 m × 1000 m

Simulation Scenarios
S1
S2
S3

Number of CVs = 20
Number of CVs = 50
Number of CVs = 100

Number of LTE BSs

4 (bs1-bs4)
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Number of WiFi APs

9 (ap1-ap9)

LTE BS range

1000 m

WiFi AP range

100 m

WiFi path loss exponent

3

LTE BS transmission power

10 Watts / 40 dBm

WiFi AP transmission power

0.1 Watts / 20 dBm

WiFi AP / LTE BS channel bandwidth

20 MHz

LTE BS number of channels

100

WiFi AP number of channels

10

RSSI threshold for reliable comm.

-75 dBm

LTE BS bandwidth capacity

50 Mbps

WiFi AP bandwidth capacity

50 Mbps

CV Application bandwidth requirement

2 Mbps

Shadowing effect in path loss (χ)

0

Prediction window (q)

14 timesteps

Lookback window in stacked LSTM

5 timesteps

model
Channel utilization factor parameters

ζ=5, ρ=1.3

CV speed range

0-30 m/s

The architecture of the multi-step predictive model is shown in Figure 3.4. A
stacked LSTM model is used to predict CV positions. An LSTM model can capture the
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short-term and long-term dependencies in time series data (Hochreiter and Schmidhuber
1997). Moreover, a stacked LSTM model allows for greater model complexity compared
to a single-layer LSTM model. As the author predicts the positions of CVs for a large
network with many complex movement patterns, a more complex stacked LSTM model
performs better since it can incorporate these complexities into the model parameters.
The inputs to the model are the positions of a CV at 5 previous timesteps; pi(t), pi(t-1),
pi(t-2), pi(t-3), pi(t-4). Considering x-y coordinates, the total number of inputs is 10 (twice
the previous timesteps). Two hidden layers contain 100 LSTM neurons each. The output
layer is a dense layer containing 2q neurons, where q is the number of predicted
timesteps. 2q neurons are required due to x-y coordinates. As a result, the model is able
to predict the future positions of the CV, pi(t), pi(t-1), pi(t-2), pi(t-3), pi(t-4). The
activation function for the hidden layers and the output layer is a rectified linear unit
(ReLU). The model training parameters used in this study are epochs: 300, batch size:
1024, optimizer: Adam, learning rate: 0.001. The author evaluated the performance of the
model in terms of root mean square error (RMSE) and mean absolute percentage error
(MAPE) for the three different simulation scenarios (S1, S2, and S3) considered in this
study. The average RMSE and MAPE values for scenarios S1, S2, and S3 are 2.1m,
3.2m, 13.9m, and 1.7%, 4.1%, 8.1%, respectively (Figure 3.5). The accuracy of the
LSTM model reduces with an increasing number of CVs. A higher number of CVs
indicates high congestion and irregular traffic patterns, which makes it difficult for the
LSTM model to predict the position of CVs. The LSTM model accuracy can be
maintained by controlling the size of zones in the ECHO system. Each upper fixed edge
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node is responsible for RAT selection of a zone. In this study, the author identifies that
S2 is the threshold scenario. Therefore, if the ECHO architecture is designed such that the
number of CVs within the zone is below 50, then the accuracy of the LSTM model will
be appropriate for RAT selection.

Figure 3.5 RMSE and MAPE of the stacked LSTM model for different scenarios
The author has used the GLPK (GNU Linear Programming Kit) solver, which
uses the branch-and-cut method (combination of branch-and-bound algorithm and
Gomory's mixed-integer cuts) to solve the integer programming problem described in the
“RAT Selection Model” section. Branch-and-bound is a reliable method to achieve
globally optimal solutions to mixed-integer programming problems, but it is
computationally very slow, which would not be useful in a CV scenario with dynamic
topology changes. Gomory’s mixed-integer cut is a fast solution method, but the results
are unreliable. The branch-and-cut method combines the capabilities of the two methods
to provide reliable solutions with low computational burden, which is ideal for CV
scenarios. Branch-and-cut is widely used to obtain globally optimal solutions to mixedinteger programming problems (Ceria et al. 1998).
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(a)

(b)
Figure 3.6 Comparison of DHO, ECHO-O and ECHO-OP system in terms of: (a)
Total Handover latency for each individual CV in scenario S1; (b) Average
handover latency of CVs for all scenarios
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The handover latency is calculated for each CV in all simulation scenarios (S1,
S2, and S3). In the ECHO-O and ECHO-OP system, the handover latency is calculated
by measuring the elapsed time between the CV receiving the handover request and
establishing communication with the upper fixed edge through the new AP/BS. Figure
3.6(a) shows that the ECHO-OP system is superior to the DHO and ECHO-O systems in
terms of each CV's handover latency in scenario S1. The other two scenarios (S2 and S3)
follow a similar trend. The aggregated results are presented in Figure 3.6(b) to illustrate
the improvements achieved using the optimization model and the prediction model
together. The ECHO-O system reduces the average handover latency by 30%, 16%, 18%
from the DHO system for scenarios S1, S2, and S3, respectively. The ECHO-OP system
further reduces the average handover latency by 32%, 40%, 41% from the ECHO-O
system and 53%, 50%, 52% from the DHO system, for scenarios S1, S2, and S3,
respectively.
Regarding individual CV communication latency and packet loss, the ECHO-OP
system is superior compared to the ECHO-O and DHO systems. The communication
latency and packet loss are calculated for the data flow from each CV to the upper fixed
edge node. Figures 3.7(a) and 3.7(b) show that the ECHO-O system improves the average
latency by 26% over the DHO system, and the ECHO-OP system improves latency by
11% over the ECHO-O system. Overall, the ECHO-OP system reduces the latency by
34% over the DHO system. In terms of packet loss, the ECHO-O system achieves an
improvement of 32% over the DHO system, and the ECHO-OP system achieves a gain of
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34% over the ECHO-O system. Overall, the ECHO-OP system achieves a packet loss
improvement of 55% over the DHO system.

(a)

(b)
Figure 3.7 Comparison of DHO, ECHO-O and ECHO-OP system in terms of: (a)
Average latency for each individual CV in scenario S1; (b) Average packet loss for
each individual CV in scenario S1
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In Figure 3.8(a), the author illustrates the average load on individual LTE BSs
(bs1-bs4) and Wi-Fi APs (ap1-ap9) for scenario S1. The ECHO-O system and the
ECHO-OP system reduces the average load by redistributing the load on LTE BSs among
nearby Wi-Fi APs. The other two scenarios yield similar results. Figure 3.8(b) shows the
reduction of maximum load on any individual Wi-Fi AP and LTE BS. Because of better
load balancing, the maximum load is reduced in both the ECHO-O and ECHO-OP
systems. The ECHO-O system reduces the maximum load by 20% from the DHO
system. The ECHO-OP system reduces the maximum load by 28% from the DHO system
and 10% from the ECHO-O system. Figure 3.8(c) aggregates the average load for Wi-Fi
APs and LTE BSs for all three systems in scenarios S1, S2, and S3. The ECHO-O system
reduces the combined average load (Wi-Fi APs and LTE BSs) by 9%, 10% and 3% from
the DHO system, for scenarios S1, S2, and S3, respectively. The ECHO-OP system
reduces the combined average load by 6%, 7%, and 5% from the DHO system, for
scenarios S1, S2, and S3, respectively. In the ECHO-OP system, the load balancing
among different APs and BSs is slightly compromised to achieve lower handover delays
for CVs. Overall, the author considers the ECHO-OP system superior since it achieves
significant improvement over the ECHO-O system in terms of handover latency, load
balancing, communication latency and packet loss for all scenarios All latency and packet
loss measurements have been performed using the tool “Ping” in real-time during the
simulation, and bandwidth measurements have been performed using Iperf (Tirumala,
Cottrell and Dunigan 2003).
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(a)

(b)
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(c)
Figure 3.8 Comparison of DHO, ECHO-O and ECHO-OP system in terms of: (a)
Average Load on each individual AP/BS in scenario S1; (b) Maximum load on any
WiFi AP and LTE BS in scenario S1; (c) Combined Average load on LTE BSs and
WiFi APs for all scenarios
For a more granular analysis, the author examined the ECHO-OP system's
performance for a random individual CV, whose ID is CV02, from scenario S1. Figures
3.9(a) and 3.9(v) show that the ECHO-O system improves over the DHO system, and the
ECHO-OP system improves over the ECHO-O system. Figure 3.9(b) shows the effect of
frequent handovers on packet loss. Each time the CV performs a handover, there is a
spike in the packet loss as it loses connectivity with the upper edge node. The ECHO-OP
system removes the frequent AP/BS handovers present in the DHO and ECHO-O
systems, reducing the packet loss related to handovers. However, as the author has seen
from Figure 3.7(a), this reduction in handovers does not impact the communication
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latency. All delay and packet loss measurements have been performed by continuously
pinging the upper edge node from each CV during the simulation. During the handover
process, the CV temporarily loses connection with the upper edge node, so some packets
are lost. After the handover, the delay of the first packet is higher, resulting in a higher
average delay.

(a)

(b)
Figure 3.9 Comparison of DHO, ECHO-O and ECHO-OP system in simulation
scenario S1 for CV02: (a) Handover pattern; (b) Packet loss

51

Conclusions
This paper has developed an edge-centric handover management system for
heterogeneous wireless networks containing Wi-Fi APs and LTE BSs. The handover
management system is a multi-layered edge-centric system where upper and lower edge
nodes are combined to manage the handover of CVs. The upper edge node contains the
RAT selection model, which includes a multi-step prediction model to predict the CV
positions, and an integer programming model to find the optimal RAT selection strategy.
Then, the lower edge nodes and mobile edge nodes combine to implement the handovers
based on the optimal RAT selections from the upper edge node. The optimization model
in RAT selections ensures that each CV connects to the appropriate AP/BS based on
signal strength, channel utilization, and load balancing among different APs/BSs. The CV
position prediction model ensures that the near-term optimal strategy can be predicted,
and unnecessary handover can be removed.
From the analysis, the author has found that the ECHO system successfully
addresses two major networking problems through effective load balancing and removal
of unnecessary handovers in a short period. The ECHO system reduces handover delay
for each CV while meeting CV application bandwidth requirements. Moreover, the
communication delay and packet loss of each CV are reduced. Furthermore, the load is
distributed among different Wi-Fi APs and LTE BSs, so the system's combined average
load is reduced. The ECHO system is the first global handover management system
where multi-layered edge-computing is being used for handover management. Through
this study, the author has found that edge computing can improve overall system
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performance by moving the computation out of the mobile nodes and distributing it in
different edge layers. Moreover, the introduction of a CV position prediction model on
top of an optimization model removed unnecessary handovers by CVs. Overall, the
ECHO system will advance future research on handover management for the Internet of
Vehicles in heterogeneous networks using edge computing paradigms.
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CHAPTER FOUR
A HYBRID DEFENSE METHOD AGAINST ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS ON
TRAFFIC SIGN CLASSIFIERS IN AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
Introduction
Adversarial attacks can make deep neural network models predict incorrect output
labels, such as misclassified traffic signs, for autonomous vehicle (AV) operations.
Resilience against adversarial attacks can help AVs navigate safely on the road. In this
study, the author develops a resilient traffic sign classifier for autonomous vehicles using
a hybrid defense method. This method is a combination of three different strategies:
random filtering, ensembling, and local feature mapping. The author uses transfer
learning to re-train the Inception-V3 and Resnet-152 models as traffic sign classifiers.
The author uses the random cropping and resizing technique as random filtering, and the
author uses an optical character recognition model as a local feature mapper. This defense
method has been tested for the no attack scenario and against well-known untargeted
adversarial attacks (e.g., PGD attack, FGSM attack, MIM attack, and C&W attack). The
author finds that the defense method achieves 99% average traffic sign classification
accuracy for the no attack scenario and 88% average traffic sign classification accuracy
for all attack scenarios. Moreover, the hybrid method improves the accuracy upon the
best baseline defense method by 6%, 50%, and 55% for FGSM, MIM, and PGD attacks,
respectively.
Convolutional neural networks (CNN) have made remarkable progress in the field
of object recognition, surpassing human recognition performance in the ImageNet Large
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Scale Visual Recognition Challenge (ILSVRC) 2017 with an error rate of 2.25% (Hu et
al. 2018). However, research has shown that there are many security threats that can
compromise a DL model and make it predict or classify incorrectly. In terms of
applications, adversarial attacks have shown to be successful in several cases, such as
speech recognition (Cisse et al. 2017), robot vision (Melis et al. 2017), and image
classification (Liu et al. 2016). Putting small stickers or patches on traffic signs can make
the DL model misclassify the image label. Another type of attack is an adversarial attack,
where an attacker creates a perturbation model to alter the input (i.e., traffic sign image)
and make the DL model predict incorrect traffic sign labels. Previous studies have
already shown that adversarial attacks can deceive a traffic sign classifier in vehicles (Li
et al. 2020) (Morgulis et al. 2019). The perturbation may be minimal such that the
alterations are not visible to the human eye, but these small perturbations are sufficient to
deceive a deep learning image classifier.
There are primarily two types of adversarial attacks, untargeted and targeted. In
the untargeted attack, the perturbation model is designed to make the DL model
misclassify without any target label. For the targeted attack, the perturbation model is
designed so that the DL model predicts a specific target label. From another viewpoint,
there are three types of adversarial attacks: black-box, gray-box, and white-box attacks
(Bakhti et al. 2019). For the black-box setting, the attacker has no access to the model, its
parameters, or the defense method in use. In this case, the attacker creates the
perturbation model based on some generic model and relies on the transferability
property. In the gray-box setting, the attacker has full access to the model and its
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parameters, but it has no access to the defense method. For the white-box setting, the
attacker always has full access to the model, its parameters, and the defense method. All
these attacks can be targeted or untargeted depending on the perturbation model.
Considering the impact of adversarial attacks on traffic sign classifiers for AVs, it is
essential to develop resilient defense methods for traffic sign classifiers. Here, resilience
is defined as the capability of a traffic sign classifier to classify correctly when the input
is perturbed using adversarial attacks.
Some popular defense methods against adversarial attacks are adversarial training,
adversarial detection, input reconstruction, input denoising, classifier robustification,
network verification, and a combination of multiple models such as defensive distillation
and ensembling (Wang et al. 2019). While these methods can increase the resilience of
ML models in attack scenarios, their performances are not comparable to the non-attack
scenarios. In this study, the author focuses on developing a resilient traffic sign
classification system that will perform similarly regardless of attack or no-attack
scenarios. The author focuses on an untargeted white-box setting since it allows the
attacker full access, and it is the most powerful type of adversarial attack. The attacker
will have access to the original DL model but will not have access to the underlying
defense method, which will be protected by additional security measures. The author has
developed a hybrid defense method combining three different approaches: random
filtering, ensembling, and local feature mapping. This hybrid approach is the first of its
kind, and no previous work has attempted such a method for defense against adversarial
attacks. Moreover, this is the first formal defense method specific to adversarial attacks
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on traffic sign classifiers, as previous models have been tested on generic datasets, and
they are not specific to any particular application. Previous literature has proposed
defense methods that are deterministic, limited by existing attack types, and not resilient
to new types of attacks. The hybrid defense method achieves similar accuracies in attack
and non-attacks scenarios, and it is not specific to any particular type of attack. The
presence of multiple models makes it difficult for attacks to find an optimum adversary
that can deceive all models. Moreover, the use of random filtering introduces randomness
in the classification process and using localized features increases model resilience since
these features are less susceptible to adversarial perturbations applied on the entire image.
Related Work
Defense against adversarial attacks and improving model resilience is a growing
research area. Many recent studies have developed defense methods by combining
different strategies. Here, the author describes some state-of-the-art defense methods,
their limitations, and how to address these limitations in this study.
Adversarial training is a type of defense method where the classification model is
re-trained using adversarial examples (Wang et al. 2019). It has been shown that retraining the models using adversarial samples from powerful models such as PGD is an
effective way to increase the model resilience against many types of adversarial attacks
(Ren et al. 2020) (Yuan et al. 2019). Many existing studies have used adversarial training
as a defense method (Madry et al. 2017) (Tramer et al. 2017). Generative adversarial
networks (GAN) are also popular as a defense method (Ren et al. 2020). For example,
Yuan and He developed an adversarial dual network learning method supported by
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random image transform as a defense method (Yuan and He 2020). At first, the input
image is transformed using random filtering. After that, there is a generative adversarial
network (GAN) model, which contains two different sub-models, the generative cleaning
model, and a detector model. The generative model tries to reconstruct the original image
by removing the noise from the image transform and the detector network for the target
classifier to be defended. The two models are trained together using adversarial learning.
The target is that the detector network cannot detect the attack noise pattern in the images
recovered by the generative network. This method performs well compared to baseline
adversarial learning methods for different white, black, and grey box attacks. However,
the accuracy under attack is still significantly lower than accuracy with no attack, so there
is scope for improvement. However, this method is not efficient because it has high
computational requirements and it is not generic for all types of perturbations. New types
of attack models can be developed which can generate adversarial samples and bypass
this defense method (Yuan et al. 2019). So, the author did not pursue this method in this
study.
Adding external models before or after the classification model is another method
that has shown great potential (Ren et al. 2020). Denoising input images before feeding
them to the classification model is an effective defense method. In this method, a
denoiser model, such as an autoencoder, can be used to remove the noise in the image,
which would increase the classification accuracy (Yuan et al. 2019). Several studies have
used denoising models for adversarial resilience (Bakhti et al. 2019) (Meng and Chen
2017). For example, Bakhti et al. developed a defense method using deep denoising
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sparse autoencoder (DDSA) (Bakhti et al. 2019). DDSA removes the noise from the
image before it enters the classification model. The denoising autoencoder is used for
dimensionality reduction and reducing the effect of noise; the sparsity constraint is used
for sparse activation in the fully connected layers of the autoencoder, thus enabling the
neurons to be intermittently inactive and extracting meaningful and relevant features. The
model is trained using clean data and adversarial examples using PGD attacks. Although
it has been proven that PGD samples generalize well for all types of attacks, they cannot
cover all types of attacks, so an autoencoder trained on PGD samples is not a universal
and generic defense method (Yuan et al. 2019). Another method for denoising is feature
denoising. Instead of denoising at the pixel level, a model can be developed that removes
the noise from the extracted feature space introduced by adversarial attacks (Ren et al.
2020). In both cases, the denoiser network needs adversarial samples for training, so it
suffers from the same issue as adversarial training (Wang et al. 2019).
Image transformation and filtering is an effective method against adversarial
attacks (Wang et al. 2019). It is a generic process where some type of transformation is
applied to the input to reduce the effect of perturbation (Ren et al. 2020). Several studies
have used image filtering techniques to increase model accuracy (Aprilpyone et al. 2019)
(Panda et al. 2019). For example, Aprilpyone et al. developed an adversarial defense
method using one-bit double quantization. First, they applied 1-bit dithering on training
images and trained the classification model (i.e., Resnet) (Aprilpyone et al. 2019). In the
testing phase, they applied 1-bit dithering on the input image, followed by a linear
quantization stage for removing the noise. They created three different white-box attacks
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on two different datasets and showed improvement over baseline defense methods.
However, the biggest limitation of their study is that their defense method cannot handle
attacks on the image before 1-bit dithering. This is not practical in real-world scenarios,
where it is not known whether an image is clean or noisy (Aprilpyone et al. 2019). The
advantage of this method is that it is not specific to certain types of attacks. It is a generic
approach that can be applied to any scenario. However, this method may reduce the
accuracy of the no-attack scenario (Ren et al. 2020).
Another popular technique for making the model resilient against adversarial
attacks is ensembling (Wang et al. 2019). Usually, white-box attacks have perfect
knowledge of the classification model, and if it is a single model, then it can be used to
develop an effective attack model for that classifier (Ren et al. 2020). However, for an
ensemble of classifiers, it is difficult to optimize and create the perfect attack model that
can deceive all models within the ensemble. That is why an ensemble approach with an
aggregation strategy to combine the model outputs is an effective defense method (Yuan
et al. 2019). Several studies have explored the use of ensembling techniques (Mun and
Kang 2019) (Abbasi and Gagne 2017). For example, Mun and Kang developed an
ensemble method for achieving adversarial resilience. They encoded the output of the
CNN model using a random binary method and created an ensemble of CNN models with
different encoding schemes (Mun and Kang 2019). The ensemble of models is trained
together using a unified global objective function. They have used three different types of
white-box attacks on three benchmark classification datasets and showed that using an
ensemble of models with different encoding schemes improves the classification
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accuracy compared to using the same encoding scheme. However, they did not compare
with other state-of-the-art adversarial defense methods (Mun and Kang 2019). The
models that are part of the ensemble need to be independently good classifiers; otherwise,
the overall accuracy of the model decreases.
Overall, from the literature, the author has found several gaps which are addressed
in this study. At first, existing defense methods have been tested for benchmark datasets
such as MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and CIFAR-10. However, the author did not find any
method that was tested for traffic sign classifiers, so the effect of the adversarial attack on
traffic sign classifiers and potential defense method is still an unexplored area. Moreover,
different methods showed improvement for different attack scenarios, but the author did
not find any generalized defense method that can be effective against all adversarial
attacks. Also, the author did not find any defense method that uses local feature mapping
to increase model resilience. Finally, the author did not find any hybrid method that
combines different defense strategies to increase the resilience of the classifier. A
combination of random filtering, ensembling, and local feature mapping has not been
explored in any previous studies. These are the research gaps the author addresses in this
study.
Hybrid Defense Method
This section will discuss the research method, specifically the dataset, attack
model, hybrid defense method, and testing scenario for defense against adversarial
attacks for traffic sign classification.
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Dataset
In this study, the author develops a traffic sign classifier; hence consider a dataset
containing different types of US traffic signs. From the literature, the author has found
that the extended LISA traffic sign dataset contains the most comprehensive collection of
US traffic sign images (Møgelmose et al. 2015). The traffic sign images are extracted
from video frames in the LISA dataset. The video is collected from the dashboard camera
of many different vehicles. The vehicles were driven around San Diego in California. The
resolution of the original video frames varied between 640×480 pixels and 1024×522
pixels. The annotations of traffic signs within the frames varied between 6×6 pixels and
167×168 pixels. The images were a mixture of color and grayscale. There is a total of
7855 annotations on 6610 images. There are 47 types of traffic signs in the original
dataset.
After examining the dataset, the author found that not all traffic sign images
contain sufficient data for training and testing a classifier. Moreover, some of the images
had the traffic sign in a small region of the whole image. Therefore, for this study, the
author created a modified traffic sign dataset containing only 18 types of traffic signs
instead of 47. The author applied cropping to remove the surrounding noise and focus on
the traffic sign. Figure 4.1 contains a sample image for each type of traffic sign from the
dataset prepared in this study.
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Figure 4.1 Samples of Modified Traffic Sign Dataset for this study
Attack Models
In this study, the author has used four types of white-box attacks to test the
efficacy of the hybrid defense method: Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) Attack,
Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) Attack, Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) Attack,
and Carlini and Wagner (C&W) Attack.
FGSM Attack: Goodfellow et al. first proposed an efficient untargeted attack called the
FGSM to generate adversarial samples (Goodfellow et al. 2014). FGSM is a typical onestep attack algorithm, which performs the one-step update along the direction of the
gradient of the adversarial loss and thus increases the loss in the steepest direction. The
FGSM-generated adversarial sample is formulated as shown in equation 4.1.
𝑥 ′ = 𝑥 + 𝜀. 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛[∇𝑥 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥, 𝑦)]

(4.1)

where y is output, x is input before the attack, θ is the set of parameters of the
model, x’ is the input after the attack, ε is the magnitude of the perturbation, ∇x is the
differential operator with respect to x, and J is the loss function (cost). It has been
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discovered that random perturbing before executing FGSM on benign samples can
enhance the performance and the diversity of the FGSM adversarial samples. Figure 4.2
shows the effect of the FGSM attack on a sample stop sign image. The individual pixel
values have been modified such that it still looks like a stop sign, but a classifier
misclassifies it as a merge sign.

Figure 4.2 Effect of attack models and image transformations on sample traffic sign
image (STOP sign)
MIM Attack: Inspired by the momentum optimizer, Dong et al. presented the integration
of the momentum memory into the basic iterative method (BIM) and derived a new
iterative algorithm called MIM (Dong et al. 2018). Here, momentum is a part of the
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gradient descent method. In gradient descent, the direction of the steepest slope is
calculated for a function, and a momentum term ensures that the algorithm does not
change direction instantly at some point of the function, rather it keeps going in the same
direction for some time before changing direction. Specifically, MIM updates the
adversarial sample iteratively following equation 4.2.
′
𝑥𝑡+1
= 𝑥𝑡′ + 𝛼. 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(𝑔𝑡+1 )

(4.2)

Here, the gradient g is updated using equation 4.3.
𝑔𝑡+1 = 𝜉. 𝑔𝑡 +

𝛻𝑥 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦)
‖∇𝑥 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦)‖

(4.3)

Here, α is the magnitude of the perturbation, and ξ is a decay factor. Since it is an
iterative process, the perturbation for the next timestep t+1 depends on the perturbed
input xt’ and gradient gt from the current timestep t. The combination of MIM and
ensemble attack strategy won first place in the non-targeted adversarial attack and
targeted adversarial attack competitions (black-box setting) at the 2017 Neural
Information Processing Systems (NIPS) conference (Dong et al. 2018). Figure 4.2 shows
the effect of MIM attack on a sample stop sign image. The individual pixel values have
been modified such that it still looks like a stop sign, but a classifier misclassifies it as a
merge sign.
PGD Attack: The PGD can be considered as a generalized version of BIM without the
constraint on the value of ε. To constrain the adversarial perturbations, the PGD projects
the learned adversarial samples into the ε-Linf neighbor of the benign samples (Madry et
al. 2017). Hence, the adversarial perturbation size is smaller than ε. Formally, the update
procedure follows equation 4.4.
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′
𝑥𝑡+1
= 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑗{𝑥𝑡′ + 𝛼. 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛[∇𝑥 𝐽(𝜃, 𝑥𝑡 , 𝑦)]}

(4.4)

where Proj projects the updated adversarial sample into the ε-Linf neighbor and a
valid range. Figure 4.2 shows the effect of PGD attack on a sample stop sign image. The
individual pixel values have been modified such that it still looks like a stop sign but a
classifier misclassifies it as a merge sign.
C&W Attack: Carlini and Wagner propose a set of optimization-based adversarial attacks
(C&W attacks) that can generate L0, L2, and Linf norm measured adversarial samples,
namely CW0, CW2, and CWinf (Carlini and Wagner 2017). Similar to L-BFGS, it
formulates the optimization objective as follows:
min 𝐷(𝑥, 𝑥 + 𝛿 ) + 𝑐. 𝑓(𝑥 + 𝛿)
𝛿

where x+δ∈[0,1]; δ denotes the adversarial perturbation; D denotes the L0, L2, or
Linf distance metric; and f(x+δ) denotes a customized adversarial loss that satisfies
f(x+δ)<0 if and only if the DNN’s prediction is the attack target. To ensure (x+δ) yields a
valid image, it introduces a new variable κ to substitute δ using equation 4.5.
1
𝛿 = [tanh(𝜅) + 1] − 𝑥
2

(4.5)

which ensures that (x+δ) is always in the range [0,1] in the optimization process.
C&W attacks are very powerful for generating adversarial examples. They achieved a
100% attack success rate on naturally trained DNNs for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
ImageNet [26]. They also compromised defensive distilled models, such as L-BFGS and
DeepFool, and prevented these models from identifying the adversarial samples (Carlini
and Wagner 2017). Figure 4.2 shows the effect of C&W attack on a sample stop sign
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image. The individual pixel values have been modified such that it still looks like a stop
sign, but a classifier misclassifies it as a merge sign.
Hybrid Defense Method
In this section, the author describes the defense method for improving the
resilience of traffic sign classification regardless of the type of adversarial attack.
Therefore, the author has adopted a hybrid defense method in this study. The hybrid
method combines three different defense strategies to improve the model resilience. The
three strategies are random filtering, ensembling, and local feature mapping. The author
has used several deep neural network (DNN) models as part of the defense method. The
author describes these DNN models and the hybrid defense method testing in regular and
adversarial scenarios.
Random Filtering: Random filtering is a type of image transformation where some
parameters of the transformation technique are generated randomly so that the adversary
is unable to predict the type of transformation that the image will go through, thus
weakening the effect of adversarial effect on the image classification model. In this study,
the author has used random cropping and resizing as the random image transformation
method. In this technique, the frame size of the cropping remains fixed, but the area or
position of the cropping is fixed randomly. During the training of the image classification
models, data augmentation is used to generate different variations of the dataset. One of
the image transformation methods used during data augmentation is random cropping and
resizing. As a result, a DNN model trained using image augmentation is able to classify
images with cropped versions of images. This means that the model is trained to predict

67

using partial information from images. This capability of DNN models is used to improve
the model resilience in this study.
Ensembling: In this study, the author has developed two separate traffic sign
classification DNN models and used an ensemble technique to combine their outputs.
Random cropping and resizing is used to generate several random samples from one
input image. The two classifiers are used to predict several output labels. The plurality
voting technique is used to extract one output label from a list of output labels. This is
how the ensembling technique is applied, where multiple output labels from multiple
classifiers are combined into a single output. The details of the classifiers used in this
study are given below.
Inception-V3 Model: The base model for traffic sign classification is the Inception-V3
model. The Inception-V3 model is the third version of Google’s CNN model primarily
created for the ImageNet recognition challenge. It is an improvement to the previous
inception models focusing on fewer computational requirements. Several techniques have
been used for optimizing the network performance, such as factorized convolutions,
regularization, dimension reduction, and parallelized computations. Figure 4.3 shows the
transfer learning process of the Inception-V3 model. The author uses the transfer learning
process to re-train the Inception-V3 model using traffic sign images from the LISA
dataset. The dashed enclosed border indicates the changes to the original model
architecture for the re-training process using traffic sign images. After applying transfer
learning, the author gets an Inception-V3 model which is trained on traffic sing images,
so it can be used as a standalone classifier. From Table 4.1, the author observes the
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architecture of the original Inception-V3 model. The model takes RGB images of
299×299×3 dimensions as input. After that, there is a series of convolution, pooling, and
inception layers. The author stops at the second from the last layer, which is a flattened
linear layer consisting of 2048 neurons. The author adds a fully connected layer
consisting of 18 neurons for the 18 class labels of traffic signs. The author uses the
argmax function to convert the logits to a single class label. This is the baseline model for
traffic sign classification in this study, and the author compares the performance of all
other models to this model. Also, as it is considered the base model for the Hybrid
method, the white-box attacks the author generates will be based on this particular model.
Table 4.1 Inception-V3 Model Architecture
Layer Type

Patch Size/Stride

Input Dimension

Conv

3×3/2

299×299×3

Conv

3×3/1

149×149×32

Conv (Padded)

3×3/1

147×147×32

Pool

3×3/2

147×147×64

Conv

3×3/1

73×73×64

Conv

3×3/2

71×71×80

Conv

3×3/1

35×35×192

3XInception

N/A

35×35×288

5XInception

N/A

17×17×768

2XInception

N/A

8×8×1280
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Pool

8×8

8×8×2048

Linear

Logits

1×1×2048

Softmax

Classifier

1×1×1000

Resnet-152 Model: Resnet-152 is another traffic sign classification model besides the
Inception-V3 model. In this model, residual nets with a depth of up to 152 layers are
used, and the model is trained on the ImageNet dataset. Table 4.2 shows the architecture
of the Resnet-152 model. The model is divided into five stages of convolution. Each
stage contains multiple layers, as shown in the table. For example, the second
convolution stage contains nine layers. The total number of layers from the five
convolution stages and the average pooling stage is 152; hence the name is Resnet-152.
The input is an RGB image with dimensions 224×224×3. The output of the 5th
convolution stage is a flattened linear layer consisting of 2048 neurons. Like InceptionV3, the author uses an FC layer with 18 neurons and the argmax function to convert the
logits to a single class label. The author also uses transfer learning to re-train the Resnet152 model on the traffic sign dataset created in this study. As shown in Figure 4.3, the
transfer learning process for the Resnet-152 model follows the process for the InceptionV3 model. The model is re-trained on the traffic sign images, and the re-trained model is
shown inside a dashed enclosed border in the figure. After the re-training process is
complete, the author gets a modified Resnet-152 model that can be used as a standalone
classifier.
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Table 4.2 Resnet-152 Model Architecture
Layer Name

Output Size

Operations

Conv1

112×112

7×7, 64, Stride 2

Conv2_x

56×56

[1×1×64] ×3
[3×3×64] ×3
[1×1×256] ×3

Conv3_x

28×28

[1×1×128] ×8
[3×3×128] ×8
[1×1×512] ×8

Conv4_x

14×14

[1×1×256] ×36
[3×3×256] ×36
[1×1×1024] ×36

Conv5_x

7×7

[1×1×512] ×3
[3×3×512] ×3
[1×1×2048] ×3

Average Pooling

1×1

1000-d fc, softmax

Figure 4.3 Transfer learning applied to Inception-V3 and Resnet-152 model
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Local Feature Mapping: The author examined the traffic sign dataset and found that an
essential local feature of the traffic sign images is words/text. Some traffic signs contain
specific text in a localized region of the image, and this text is usually unique to the
traffic sign (i.e., “STOP” for stop sign). The localized text is a resilient feature since the
perturbation is applied to the whole image and is not concentrated on adding noise to the
text. Adversarial attacks create perturbations in images that are usually not visible to the
human eye. Text detection and recognition models are more robust to variations in text
patterns; hence they offer an effective way to correctly classify images of traffic signs
with text. However, this approach is not effective for traffic signs without text. Therefore,
it can be used in conjunction with other approaches, but not as a standalone defense
approach. In this study, the author has used the Keras optical character recognition
(OCR) pipeline for extracting texts from images (Maitrichit and Hnoohom 2020). In this
pipeline, there are two models. The CRAFT (Character Region Awareness for Text)
detection model is used for detecting the regions containing the text (Baek et al. 2019).
The pipeline uses a convolutional recurrent neural network (CRNN) model for
recognizing the text in the identified regions. The CRAFT model is trained on several
datasets, including SynthText, IC13, IC15, and IC17. The CRNN model is trained on the
Synth90K dataset. The author does not re-train the model with the traffic sign dataset
since the pre-trained model achieves an accuracy of 99% in detecting text in non-attack
traffic sign images containing text.
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Figure 4.4 Hybrid Defense Method testing for regular and adversarial input
Testing for Regular and Adversarial Input: Figure 4.4 shows the inference process of the
hybrid defense method for regular and adversarial input images. The adversarial attack is
applied to the Inception-V3 model as it is considered the baseline classification model in
this study. The adversarial perturbation can also be created using the Resnet-152 model,
and it will not impact the output of the hybrid defense method.
The output of the Inception-V3 model is a traffic sign label. The same image is
also input to the pre-trained CRAFT+CRNN model for text detection and recognition.
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The output is a set of words and regions from the image. A word template matching
function identifies matches with a set of templates and outputs another traffic sign label
based on template matching. A template match indicates the successful identification of
relevant texts in the image. The matching of two traffic sign labels means that it is the
correct label and there is no attack detected. In case of a mismatch, the label generated
from the CRAFT+CRNN model is trusted as the correct label. This situation is identified
as the attack scenario.
Failure to identify a template match means that the CRAFT+CRNN model was
unable to detect the text, or the author has encountered a traffic sign which has no text.
The 299×299×3 image is converted to a 224×224×3 image for the Resnet-152 model.
Random cropping and resizing are applied to both images simultaneously. For the
Inception-V3 model, the 299×299×3 image is cropped m times randomly. The cropping
dimension is kept constant, which is 280×280×3, but the cropping position is random.
The 280×280×3 images are resized again to the dimension 299×299×3. The m
299×299×3 images are input to the Inception-V3 model, which produces m traffic sign
labels. The same process is followed for the Resnet-152 model. The number of samples is
changed to n, and the cropping dimension is changed to 208×208×3. The traffic sign
labels are combined to form a traffic sign label vector of length (m+n). The author apply
plurality voting to identify the label with the highest number of occurrences. In the case
of a tie, a label is chosen randomly. This label is the final output of the hybrid defense
method. In this study, the author has used m=8 and n=10.
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Baseline Defense Method
The baseline defense methods the author has considered in this study are given
below:
JPEG Filtering: JPEG filter changes the quality of the input image. Using JPEG filtering
with quality less than 100% means that the pixels will be aggregated and coarse-grained
compared to the original image. In this study, the author has used a value of 50% as the
quality of the JPEG filtered image.
Feature Squeezing: Feature squeezing refers to reducing the color bit depth of each pixel
in an image. It is also known as bit squeezing since reducing the color depth means
reducing the number of bits required to represent a pixel’s color value. The feature space
reduction is helpful for defending against adversarial attacks since it converts different
feature vectors in the original space into similar samples. In this study, the author has
used a bit depth of 4.
Binary Filtering: This is the most straightforward defense method. It directly converts the
input image into a binary black and white image. This is a special case of feature
squeezing, where the bit depth is 1.
Random Filtering: Although the hybrid method uses random filtering as a part of the
defense, the author wanted to check how random filtering performs independently as the
defense method for adversarial attacks. Since the author performs random filtering for the
original Inception-V3 model, the author crops 299×299×3 images to 280×280×3 images
and resize the images again to 299×299×3 images. The author creates eight samples from
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each image and predicts the class label eight times. After that, plurality voting is used to
get the final class label.
Analysis and Findings
In this section, the author presents the analysis and findings from the Hybrid
defense method for different white-box attacks. The author also compares the results with
other baseline defense methods and evaluates the performance of the defense methods in
the no-attack scenario. The author explores class-wise performance metrics, as well as
overall metrics for the baseline methods and the Hybrid method. The author has used
Pytorch to implement all the models and advertorch package to create the attacks on the
images (Ding et al. 2019). All models are trained and tested in Palmetto Cluster nodes
containing Nvidia Tesla p100 GPUs. Palmetto is Clemson University's primary highperformance computing resource, containing 2021 compute nodes totaling 23072 CPU
cores.
Hybrid Defense Method Performance Evaluation and Comparison with Baseline
The author compares the Hybrid method with all other baseline methods for
different types of attacks. The author uses precision, accuracy, recall, and F1-value to
compare the models. Accuracy is computed globally for all 1451 samples in the test set.
For precision, recall, and F-1 value, the author computes the class-wise values and uses
the weighted average method to get one global value. As the number of samples is
different for different traffic signs, the author has used a weighted average to account for
the imbalance in the dataset.
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No Attack: The author has evaluated all defense methods in the no-attack scenario. A
common pitfall of existing defense methods against adversarial attacks is that it decreases
the accuracy of the classification model, when the adversarial defense is added to the
model, in the non-attack scenario. From Table 4.3, it can be observed that almost all the
defense methods are performing better or equal to the original Inception-V3 model,
except the JPEG filtering method, which reduces the accuracy to 88% from the original
98%. Hybrid and random filtering methods are able to achieve accuracy, precision, recall,
and F1-score of 99%.
Table 4.3 Comparison of Defense Methods for No Attack Scenario
Defense Method

Precision

Recall

F1-Score

Accuracy

Inception-V3

0.81

0.75

0.76

0.75

JPEG Filter

0.82

0.76

0.77

0.76

Feature Squeeze

0.81

0.75

0.76

0.75

Binary Filter

0.86

0.66

0.71

0.66

Random Filter

0.88

0.84

0.85

0.84

Hybrid

0.91

0.89

0.89

0.89

FGSM Attack: The FGSM attack is implemented for ε=0.1. The results are presented in
Table 4.4. The FGSM attack is not as effective as PGD and MIM attacks. It only reduces
the accuracy of the Inception-V3 model to 75%. The Hybrid method performs best with
the highest precision, recall, F1-score, and accuracy of 91%, 89%, 89%, and 89%,
respectively. Random filtering improves the accuracy from 75% to 84%, and the
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additional increase in accuracy can be attributed to the combination of ensembling and
local feature mapping. Local feature mapping is mostly responsible for the traffic signs
with text. For non-text signs, the Resnet-152 model helps in outputting the correct traffic
sign label. Therefore, the author concludes that ensembling, random filtering, and local
feature mapping have a significant impact in terms of adversarial resilience. Other
baseline methods such as JPEG filtering and feature squeezing are unable to improve on
the base accuracy of 75%. Binary filtering degrades the performance of the Inception-V3
model. The hybrid method improves the average accuracy by 6% over the next best
baseline defense method, which is random filtering.
Table 4.4 Comparison of Defense Methods for FGSM Attack Scenario
Defense Method

Precision

Recall

F1-Score

Accuracy

Inception-V3

0.81

0.75

0.76

0.75

JPEG Filter

0.82

0.76

0.77

0.76

Feature Squeeze

0.81

0.75

0.76

0.75

Binary Filter

0.86

0.66

0.71

0.66

Random Filter

0.88

0.84

0.85

0.84

Hybrid

0.91

0.89

0.89

0.89

MIM Attack: For the MIM attack, the author has used cross-entropy as a loss function.
The MIM attack is implemented for ε=0.1. The results are presented in Table 4.5. The
MIM attack is very effective in reducing the accuracy of the Inception-V3 model to only
10%. The Hybrid method performs best with the highest precision, recall, F1-score, and
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accuracy of 91%, 87%, 88%, and 87%, respectively. Random filtering improves the
accuracy from 10% to 53%, and the additional increase in accuracy can be attributed to
the combination of ensembling and local feature mapping. Local feature mapping is
mostly responsible for the traffic signs with text. For non-text signs, the Resnet-152
model helps in outputting the correct traffic sign label. Therefore, the author concludes
that ensembling, random filtering, and local feature mapping have a significant impact in
terms of adversarial resilience. Binary filtering performs very well in this scenario, as it
has achieved 56% accuracy, which is better than the random method. However, binary
filtering suffers from lower accuracy for non-attack images, which the author has
addressed in the Hybrid method. The Hybrid method improves the average accuracy by
50% over the next best baseline defense method, which is binary filtering.
Table 4.5 Comparison of Defense Methods for MIM Attack Scenario
Defense Method

Precision

Recall

F1-Score

Accuracy

Inception-V3

0.29

0.10

0.12

0.10

JPEG Filter

0.41

0.23

0.26

0.23

Feature Squeeze

0.32

0.12

0.16

0.12

Binary Filter

0.71

0.56

0.59

0.56

Random Filter

0.65

0.53

0.55

0.53

Hybrid

0.91

0.87

0.88

0.87

PGD Attack: For the PGD attack, the author has used infinity norm and cross-entropy as
loss functions. Here the author examines the effect of the PGD attack for ε=0.1. The
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results are presented in Table 4.6. The PGD attack is very effective in reducing the
accuracy of the Inception-V3 model to 8%. The Hybrid method performs best with the
highest precision, recall, F1-score, and accuracy of 90%, 87%, 88%, and 87%,
respectively. Random filtering improves the accuracy from 8% to 58%, and the additional
increase in accuracy can be attributed to the combination of ensembling and local feature
mapping. Local feature mapping is primarily responsible for the traffic signs with text.
For non-text signs, the Resnet-152 model helps in outputting the correct traffic sign label.
Therefore, the author concludes that ensembling, random filtering, and local feature
mapping have a significant impact in terms of adversarial resilience. After the hybrid
method and random filtering, binary filtering is the best model with an accuracy of 57%.
The Hybrid method improves the average accuracy by 55% over the next best baseline
defense method, which is random filtering.
Table 4.6 Comparison of Defense Methods for PGD Attack Scenario
Defense Method

Precision

Recall

F1-Score

Accuracy

Inception-V3

0.27

0.08

0.11

0.08

JPEG Filter

0.40

0.24

0.26

0.24

Feature Squeeze

0.31

0.11

0.15

0.11

Binary Filter

0.72

0.57

0.60

0.57

Random Filter

0.69

0.58

0.59

0.58

Hybrid

0.90

0.87

0.88

0.87
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C&W Attack: For the C&W attack, the author has used the L2 norm and 80 maximum
iterations. The results are presented in Table 4.7. The C&W attack is very effective in
reducing the accuracy of the Inception-V3 model to 13%. The Hybrid defense method
performs best with the highest precision, recall, F1-score, and accuracy of 92%, 89%,
90%, and 89%, respectively. Random filtering achieves a high accuracy of 89%.
Therefore, the author concludes that random filtering has a major impact in terms of
adversarial resilience against C&W attacks. In the hybrid method, the first line of defense
is local feature mapping, which is primarily responsible for the traffic signs with text. For
non-text signs, random filtering is able to nullify the effect of adversarial perturbations,
so the Resnet-152 model has no impact in outputting the correct traffic sign label. With
random filtering, the Inception-v3 by itself can achieve the same performance as the
hybrid method. Therefore, for the C&W attack, the author concludes that random
filtering and local feature mapping are the two dominant techniques in terms of
adversarial resilience.
Table 4.7 Comparison of Defense Methods for C&W Attack Scenario
Defense Method

Precision

Recall

F1-Score

Accuracy

Inception-V3

0.24

0.13

0.15

0.13

JPEG Filter

0.89

0.87

0.87

0.87

Feature Squeeze

0.66

0.60

0.61

0.60

Binary Filter

0.79

0.67

0.70

0.67

Random Filter

0.92

0.89

0.90

0.89

Hybrid

0.92

0.89

0.90

0.89
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Performance Evaluation with Variation of ε
The author varies the value of ε for FGSM, MIM, and PGD attacks. The values
used in this study are 0.05, 0.1, and 0.2. For all three attacks, the Hybrid method shows
the most resilience compared to all other methods, according to Figure 4.5. The analysis
revealed that the FGSM attack model is not highly effective as an ε value of 0.2 is only
able to reduce the accuracy of the Inception-V3 model from 99% to 52%. However, for
MIM and PGD attack models, an ε value of 0.2 reduces the baseline accuracies from 99%
close to 0%. The ε represents the level of distortion created on the input images with the
perturbation model of the attack, so an ε value of 0.2 for MIM and PGD attacks creates
enough distortions in the images such that the Inception-V3 model has a near 100%
misclassification rate. However, if the author uses the Hybrid defense method with the
Inception-V3 model, an ε value of 0.2 for MIM and PGD attack is unable to decrease the
classification accuracy significantly, and the Inception-V3 model is able to classify traffic
signs with an accuracy comparable to lower ε values of 0.1 and 0.05. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the Hybrid defense method is resilient against attacks with high ε values
(i.e., with highly distorted input images).
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(a)

(b)
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(c)
Figure 4.5 Performance variation of defense methods with ε for (a) FGSM Attack,
(b) MIM Attack, (c) PGD Attack
Class-wise Performance Analysis of Hybrid Defense Method for PGD Attack
The author investigates the performance of the Hybrid defense method at a lower
level. From Table 4.8, the author observes that the model performs well across all 18
labels. The precisions value for “Do Not Enter” sign and “Pedestrian Crossing” sign is
relatively lower, which means that the model sometimes misclassifies other traffic signs
as these two signs. “Lane ends” sign and “Roundabout” sign have lower recall values.
These two signs have more variation in images compared to other traffic signs, which is
the reason for the misclassifications related to these particular signs. Moreover, the
majority of the Lane ends, and roundabout signs do not contain any text, so the local
feature mapping is unable to contribute in these scenarios. Overall, the traffic signs with
text have higher recall compared to non-text signs.
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Table 4.8 Class-Wise Performance of Hybrid Defense Method for PGD Attack
Scenario
Traffic Sign Type

Precision

Recall

F1-Score

Number of Samples

Curve left

0.91

1

0.95

39

Curve right

0.98

0.85

0.91

114

Do not enter

0.68

0.93

0.79

68

Lane ends

1

0.73

0.84

62

Merge

0.72

0.85

0.78

33

Pedestrian crossing

0.49

0.84

0.62

88

Roundabout

1

0.64

0.78

61

School zone

0.92

0.95

0.93

60

Signal ahead

0.72

1

0.84

39

Speed limit 15

0.93

0.94

0.93

68

Speed limit 30

1

0.82

0.9

110

Speed limit 35

0.98

0.99

0.98

92

Speed limit 45

1

0.96

0.98

107

Speed limit 55

0.92

0.9

0.91

171

Speed limit 65

0.99

0.73

0.84

134

Stop

0.91

0.97

0.94

79

Stop ahead

0.86

0.71

0.78

45

Yield

0.94

0.95

0.94
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The author plots the confusion matrix of the Hybrid method under PGD attack
with ε=0.1. In Figure 4.6, the author observes the lower-level details of the classification
patterns among all classes. Some trends can be observed from this plot. All the speed
limit signs are sometimes misclassified as pedestrian crossing signs. Moreover, within
speed limit signs, the model sometimes classifies the 65 mph sign as 55 mph. This is due
to the similarity between the digits 5 and 6. Among the non-speed limit signs, the
misclassification generally happens in the way of “Do Not Enter” sign. Therefore, the
precision of do not enter sign and pedestrian crossing sign is low. Overall, the model
performs well across all types of traffic signs.

Figure 4.6 Confusion Matrix of Hybrid Defense Method for PGD Attack Scenario
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Conclusions
In this study, the author has developed a hybrid defense method against
adversarial attacks on traffic sign classifiers in autonomous vehicles. The analysis
revealed that the defense method is resilient to different types of untargeted white-box
adversarial attacks. When compared with baseline defense methods, the method improves
over these baseline methods.
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CHAPTER FIVE
DISSERTATION CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

Conclusions
The author developed methods and models to improve the security and reliability
of CAV communication and applications. The motivation of this dissertation was to
evaluate the hypothesis that integrating CAV communication and applications with
emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, software-defined networking, and
edge computing, will further improve the security and reliability of CAVs.
The first article presented a long short-term memory (LSTM) neural networkbased model for detecting replay attacks and amplitude-shift attacks for in-vehicle
networks (CAN). For attacks on the Dataset-I, the LSTM detection model achieved an
accuracy of 87.8% and 87.9% for replay attack and amplitude-shift attack, respectively.
For attacks on the Dataset-II, the LSTM detection model achieved an accuracy of 83.7%
and 83.8% for replay attack and amplitude-shift attack, respectively. Overall, the LSTM
detection model shows improvement in accuracy, precision, recall, and area under the
precision-recall curve (AUPRC) over the baseline detection models considered in this
study. Moreover, the detection model shows resilience as it is effective for two separate
CAN datasets and two different types of attacks considered in the study.
The second article is focused on developing an edge-centric handover (ECHO)
management system for connected vehicles (CVs) in heterogeneous wireless networks
(Wi-Fi and LTE). The RAT selection model consists of a stacked long-short-term
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memory (LSTM) model for predicting the positions of CVs and an integer programming
optimizer for RAT selection of CVs. The edge-centric handover management system is
based on software-defined networking and the RAT selection model. The author creates
two variations of the ECHO system and compare the two systems with a baseline system,
which is the decentralized handover (DHO) management system. The simulation
analyses in OpenNet show that the ECHO system reduces the average handover latency
per CV by 51% while distributing the load among the available APs/BSs and reducing
the average load on BSs/APs by 6% to the DHO system. The communication delay and
packet loss are also reduced for individual CVs. The ECHO system shows that overall
system communication reliability can be improved using an intelligent algorithm that
makes an informed decision by collecting data from different sources. Moreover,
distributed computation using digital infrastructure devices ensures that no single device
is overburdened with computation, which is the case for individual vehicle handover
management systems.
In the third article, the author develops a hybrid defense method for traffic sign
classification in AVs. This method combines three different strategies: random filtering,
ensembling, and local feature mapping. The author uses transfer learning to re-train the
Inception-V3 and Resnet-152 models as traffic sign classifiers, which gives us an
ensemble of models. The author uses the random cropping and resizing technique as
random filtering, and an optical character recognition model as a local feature mapper.
This defense method has been tested for no attack scenarios and several adversarial
attacks such as PGD attack, FGSM attack, MIM attack, and C&W attack for untargeted
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attack scenario. The author finds that the defense method achieves 99% average accuracy
for no attack scenarios and 88% average accuracy for all attack scenarios. Moreover, the
method improves the accuracy upon baseline defense methods by 6%, 50%, and 55% for
FGSM, MIM and PGD attacks, respectively. For the C&W attack, the hybrid method
achieves the same average accuracy of 89% as the random cropping method. Overall, the
hybrid defense method shows resilience against different types of adversaries while
maintaining the accuracy for no attack scenarios in traffic sign classification for AVs.
The main advantage of this method is its resilience against several different types of
adversarial attacks, which is necessary since new attack models are created every day,
and the AVs require a resilient defense method against current and future attacks.
Overall, through this dissertation, the author has developed several innovative
methods for improving the security and reliability of CAV communication and
applications. Through rigorous testing in simulation and comparison with baseline
models, it has been shown that these models have great potential for ensuring the security
and reliability of CAVs in the future. The TCPS is going through evolutionary changes
through emerging technologies, so it is necessary to ensure that CAVs can communicate
safely and reliably with other digital infrastructure, and the applications within CAVs can
be protected against cyberattacks. This will pave the way for ushering in a new age of
intelligent transportation systems within the umbrella of smart cities of the future.
Future Research
In the first article, the LSTM attack detection model for in-vehicle networks
performs better than baseline models for two different CAN datasets and two different
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types of attacks. However, the detection accuracy range is between 83% and 88%, which
needs further improvement to be used for real-world scenarios. Future research should
explore other modeling approaches for improving the detection accuracy. Moreover, the
in-vehicle network will face different types of anomalies in the real world from time to
time. Creating different anomaly detection models for different types of attacks is not
desirable since it will result in many models. Future research should explore a unified
approach, where the same model is trained and tested on different kinds of anomalies.
The complexity of such problems may require more sophisticated deep learning models
for effective anomaly detection. For a unified model, the author should create a suitable
attack dataset containing anomalies of many different types. The author only investigates
two types of anomalies in this study, but a unified attack dataset should include more
variations in the anomalies. Finally, a system evaluation needs to be performed to test the
real-time capability of attack detection models. In anomaly situations, the detection
model needs to detect it very quickly, as any delay in detection may result in catastrophic
consequences on public safety on roads. A simulation or real-world test on vehicles can
be performed in future studies to test the real-time effectiveness of the detection model.
Training can be conducted offline, but inferences should be tested in the real world.
In the second article, it has been assumed that the position data received from
each CV is accurate, which may not be true since CV position data comes from GPS,
which has inaccuracies. In future work, the inaccuracies related to GPS position should
be considered in the RAT selection model. Moreover, the evaluations in this study are
based on simulation, so field tests in real-world testbeds are required to verify the

91

simulation's outcomes. Real-world scenarios contain additional factors, such as other
nodes like vulnerable road users and roadside infrastructures (such as traffic signals) and
signal blockages due to obstructions like trees and buildings, affecting the wireless
network performance. The system needs to be tested at different locations to verify its
performance for different network topologies. The system depends on the accuracy of CV
position predictions, so significant amounts of roadway traffic data need to be collected at
specific locations to train the LSTM model for accurate predictions. Finally, commercial
cloud computing can replace the upper edge node and host the RAT selection model,
which can be explored in future research.
In the third article, the hybrid defense method should be investigated more to
improve its accuracy of 88% further. There are clear scopes for improvement, such as the
misclassifications between the same classes such as the 55-mph speed limit sign and the
65-mph speed limit sign. The model can be improved by incorporating techniques to fix
these types of micro-level issues such as incorporating accurate digit recognition to
differentiate between 5 and 6. Moreover, this approach has only been tested for a specific
application which is traffic sign recognition. It should also be tested for other benchmark
datasets such as MNIST, CIFAR-100, COCO, and ImageNet. Finally, the model should
also be tested for different types of attacks beyond the attacks considered in this study.
However, this study is a good starting point for exploring hybrid approaches for
adversarial defense in CAVs.
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Appendix A
Python Code for In-vehicle Cyberattack Detection Model
# lstm model
#from numpy.random import seed
#seed(10)
import numpy as np
import pickle
import keras.backend as K
import keras_metrics as km
from keras.models import Sequential
from keras.layers import Dense, Conv1D, MaxPooling1D
from keras.layers import Flatten
from keras.layers import Dropout
from keras.layers import LSTM
from keras.layers import TimeDistributed
from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix
from keras.optimizers import adamax, adam
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
from keras.layers import Activation
from keras.callbacks import EarlyStopping, ModelCheckpoint
from keras.models import load_model
from sklearn.metrics import precision_recall_curve, auc
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trainX = np.loadtxt('X_train4.txt', delimiter=",")
trainy = np.loadtxt('y_train4.txt')
testX = np.loadtxt('X_test4.txt', delimiter=",")
testy = np.loadtxt('y_test4.txt')

#xmin = np.array([0,0,0,0,0,0,-48,0,-15.0234742,0,0,0,0,0,0,-3276.8,0,0,0])
#xmax =
np.array([99.6094,16383.75,99.6094,99.6094,254,3,143.25,3,104.6948357,99.603,25.898
4375,99.609375,99.609375,99.609375,99.609375,3276.8,1016,15,15])
testX = (testX - trainX.min(0)) / trainX.ptp(0)
trainX = (trainX - trainX.min(0)) / trainX.ptp(0)

shape = np.shape(trainX)
trainX = trainX.reshape(shape[0],1,shape[1])
shape = np.shape(trainy)
trainy = trainy.reshape(shape[0],1)
shape = np.shape(testX)
testX = testX.reshape(shape[0],1,shape[1])
shape = np.shape(testy)
testy = testy.reshape(shape[0],1)
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# fit and evaluate a model
batch_size_arr = [16,32,128,512,1024]
epochs_arr = [300,200,500]
aprf = np.zeros((30,4))
for i in range(1):
n_timesteps, n_features, n_outputs = trainX.shape[1], trainX.shape[2],
trainy.shape[1]
epochs, batch_size, n_neurons, dropout = 300, 512, n_features, 0.2
model = Sequential()
#model.add(LSTM(n_neurons, activation='relu',
input_shape=(n_timesteps,n_features), return_sequences=True))
#model.add(LSTM(int(n_neurons/2), activation='relu', return_sequences=False))
model.add(LSTM(512, activation='relu', input_shape=(n_timesteps,n_features),
return_sequences=False))
#model.add(LSTM(64, activation='relu', return_sequences=False))
#model.add(Dropout(dropout))
model.add(Dense(8, activation='relu'))
#model.add(Dropout(dropout))
#model.add(Dense(2, activation='relu'))
#model.add(Dropout(dropout))
model.add(Dense(n_outputs, activation='sigmoid'))
opt = adamax(lr=0.001)
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model.compile(loss='mean_squared_error', optimizer=opt, metrics=['accuracy'])
model.save("model_lstm.h5")
# fit network
#early_stop = EarlyStopping(monitor='loss', min_delta=0.001, patience=3,
mode='min', verbose=1)
checkpoint = ModelCheckpoint('weights_lstm.h5', monitor='val_loss', verbose=1,
save_best_only=True, mode='min', period=1)
class_weights = {0: 1,1: 1}
history = model.fit(trainX, trainy, epochs=epochs, batch_size=batch_size,
verbose=1, validation_data=(testX,testy), callbacks=[checkpoint],
class_weight=class_weights)
# evaluate model
model2 = load_model('model_lstm.h5')
model2.load_weights('weights_lstm.h5')
#predy = model.predict(testX)
predy = model2.predict(testX)
predy0 = np.where(predy > 0.5, 1, 0)
tn, fp, fn, tp = confusion_matrix(testy, predy0).ravel()
print("tn, fp, fn, tp: ", tn, fp, fn, tp)
print("Accuracy, Precision, Recall: ", (tn+tp)/(tn+tp+fn+fp), tp/(tp+fp), tp/(tp+fn))
precision, recall, thresholds = precision_recall_curve(testy, predy)
auc = auc(recall, precision)

97

print(auc)
plt.plot(recall, precision)
plt.show()
np.savetxt('/home/mdzadik/CAN_data/pickles/lstm_auprc.csv',np.column_stack((
recall, precision)),delimiter=",")
# aprf[i,0] = (tp+tn)/(tp+fp+tn+fn)
# aprf[i,1] = tp/(tp+fp)
# aprf[i,2] = tp/(tp+fn)
# aprf[i,3] = 2*aprf[i,1]*aprf[i,2]/(aprf[i,1]+aprf[i,2])
#print("tn, fp, fn, tp: ", tn[i,j], fp[i,j], fn[i,j], tp[i,j])
# summarize history for loss
# plt.plot(history.history['loss'])
# plt.plot(history.history['val_loss'])
# plt.title('model loss')
# plt.ylabel('loss')
# plt.xlabel('epoch')
# plt.legend(['train', 'test'], loc='upper left')
# plt.show()

#print("acc(mean),acc(std),pr(mean),pr(std),rec(mean),rec(std): ",
np.mean(acc),np.std(acc),np.mean(pr),np.std(pr),np.mean(rec),np.std(rec))
#np.savetxt('/home/mdzadik/CAN_data/pickles/aprf_lstm.csv',aprf,delimiter=",")

98

Appendix B
Python Code for ECHO RAT Selection Model
import numpy as np
import math
import cvxpy as cp
import time
from scipy.stats import mode
from keras.models import load_model

ap_pos = np.array([[300, 300], [300, 700], [700, 300], [700, 700], [100, 100], [100, 500],
[100, 900], [500, 100], [500, 500], [500, 900], [900, 100], [900, 500], [900, 900]])
m = 20
n = 13
dbm_lte = 18
dbm_wifi = -20
alpha_lte = 3.76
alpha_wifi = 3
tp_lte = 10
tp_wifi = 0.1
bw = 20
beta = 0.5
nch_lte = 25
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nch_wifi = 25
kai = 5
rho = 1.3
h=1
wn = 0
lamda = 1-math.exp(-1 / ( (kai-1)**(1/kai) + (kai-1)**((1-kai)/kai) ) )

steps = 15
prev_out_ap = np.ones(m)
out_ap = np.ones(m)
filepath = 'pos.txt'
count = 0
data = np.zeros((100000,int(m*2)))
model = load_model('lstm.h5')

#for a in range(2):
while(1):
if(count>12):
d = 1000*np.ones((steps,m,n))
rssi = -100*np.ones((m,n))
fp = open(filepath)
lines = fp.readlines()
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out_ap_step = np.ones((m,steps))

if(len(lines)==m):
for i in range(m):
f = lines[i]
pos = f.strip("\n").strip("()").split(',')
if(len(pos)==3):
pos = [float(j) for j in pos]
pos = np.array(pos)
data[count,i] = pos[0]
data[count,i+m] = pos[1]
x = data[count-4:count+1,[i,i+m]].reshape((1,1,10))
y = model.predict(x)
mpos = y.reshape((steps-1,2))
for q in range(steps-1):
for r in range(2):
if(mpos[q,r]>1000):
mpos[q,r] = 2000 - mpos[q,r]
if(mpos[q,r]<0):
mpos[q,r] = 0 - mpos[q,r]

mpos = np.vstack((pos[0:2],mpos))
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print(mpos)
for k in range(steps):
for j in range(n):
d[k,i,j] = math.sqrt((mpos[k,0]-ap_pos[j,0])**2 + (mpos[k,1]ap_pos[j,1])**2)

if(count%steps == 0):
for k in range(steps):
for i in range(m):
for j in range(n):
if(j<4):
rssi[i,j] = max(min(dbm_lte - 10*alpha_lte*math.log10(d[k,i,j]),30),-100)
else:
rssi[i,j] = max(min(dbm_wifi - 10*alpha_wifi*math.log10(d[k,i,j]),30),-100)

dd = np.reshape(d[k,:,:],(m,n))
for i in range(m):
for j in range(n):
if(dd[i,j]>500):
dd[i,j] = 500
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obj = (rssi+100)/70

A1 = np.ones((1,m))
b1 =
np.array([nch_lte,nch_lte,nch_lte,nch_lte,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,
nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi]).reshape((1,n))

A2 = dd
b2 = np.hstack((500*np.ones((m,4)),100*np.ones((m,9))))

Aeq1 = np.ones((1,n))
beq1 = np.ones((1,m))

Aeq2 = np.zeros((m,n))
beq2 = np.zeros((m,n))
for p in range(m):
if(rssi[p,int(prev_out_ap[p]-1)] > -75):
Aeq2[p,int(prev_out_ap[p]-1)] = 1
beq2[p,int(prev_out_ap[p]-1)] = 1
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variables = cp.Variable((m,n), boolean=True)
constraint1 = A1 * variables <= b1
constraint2 = cp.multiply(A2, variables) <= b2
constraint3 = Aeq1 * variables.T == beq1
constraint4 = cp.multiply(Aeq2, variables) == beq2
total_utility = cp.sum(cp.multiply(obj, variables)) 0.5*cp.max(cp.sum(cp.reshape(variables, (m,n)), axis=0))
problem = cp.Problem(cp.Maximize(total_utility), [constraint1, constraint2,
constraint3, constraint4])
problem.solve(solver=cp.GLPK_MI)
for p in range(m):
ind = int(np.nonzero(variables.value[p,:])[0][0])
out_ap_step[p,k] = ind+1
prev_out_ap = out_ap_step[:,k].reshape(m)

out_ap = mode(out_ap_step,axis=1)[0].reshape(m)
np.savetxt("out_ap.csv", out_ap, fmt="%d")
prev_out_ap = out_ap

else:
d = 1000*np.ones((m,n))
rssi = -100*np.ones((m,n))
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fp = open(filepath)
lines = fp.readlines()

if(len(lines)==m):
for i in range(m):
f = lines[i]
pos = f.strip("\n").strip("()").split(',')
if(len(pos)==3):
pos = [float(j) for j in pos]
pos = np.array(pos)
for j in range(n):
d[i,j] = math.sqrt((pos[0]-ap_pos[j,0])**2 + (pos[1]-ap_pos[j,1])**2)

for i in range(m):
for j in range(n):
if(j<4):
rssi[i,j] = max(min(dbm_lte - 10*alpha_lte*math.log10(d[i,j]),-30),-100)
else:
rssi[i,j] = max(min(dbm_wifi - 10*alpha_wifi*math.log10(d[i,j]),-30),100)

dd = d
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for i in range(m):
for j in range(n):
if(d[i,j]>500):
dd[i,j] = 500

obj = (rssi+100)/70

A1 = np.ones((1,m))
b1 =
np.array([nch_lte,nch_lte,nch_lte,nch_lte,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,
nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi,nch_wifi]).reshape((1,n))

A2 = dd
b2 = np.hstack((500*np.ones((m,4)),100*np.ones((m,9))))

Aeq1 = np.ones((1,n))
beq1 = np.ones((1,m))

Aeq2 = np.zeros((m,n))
beq2 = np.zeros((m,n))
for p in range(m):
if(rssi[p,int(prev_out_ap[p]-1)] > -75):
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Aeq2[p,int(prev_out_ap[p]-1)] = 1
beq2[p,int(prev_out_ap[p]-1)] = 1

variables = cp.Variable((m,n), boolean=True)
constraint1 = A1 * variables <= b1
constraint2 = cp.multiply(A2, variables) <= b2
constraint3 = Aeq1 * variables.T == beq1
constraint4 = cp.multiply(Aeq2, variables) == beq2
total_utility = cp.sum(cp.multiply(obj, variables)) 0.5*cp.max(cp.sum(cp.reshape(variables, (m,n)), axis=0))
if(count>0):
problem = cp.Problem(cp.Maximize(total_utility), [constraint1, constraint2,
constraint3, constraint4])
else:
problem = cp.Problem(cp.Maximize(total_utility), [constraint1, constraint2,
constraint3])
problem.solve(solver=cp.GLPK_MI)
for p in range(m):
ind = int(np.nonzero(variables.value[p,:])[0][0])
out_ap[p] = ind+1

np.savetxt("out_ap.csv", out_ap, fmt="%d")
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prev_out_ap = out_ap

print(out_ap)
fp.close()
count = count+1
time.sleep(10)
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Appendix C
Python Code for Hybrid Defense Method
import os
import argparse
import torch
import torch.nn as nn
import torch.nn.functional as F

from advertorch.utils import predict_from_logits
from advertorch_examples.utils import get_mnist_test_loader
from advertorch_examples.utils import _imshow
from advertorch.attacks import CarliniWagnerL2Attack, LinfPGDAttack,
GradientSignAttack, LinfBasicIterativeAttack

from advertorch.defenses import BitSqueezing, JPEGFilter, BinaryFilter

from tqdm import tqdm
from time import sleep

import time

from sklearn.preprocessing import normalize
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from sklearn.metrics import confusion_matrix, classification_report, accuracy_score
import numpy as np
import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
import pandas as pd
import seaborn as sns

from PIL import Image
from random import randrange

import torchvision.models as models
from torchvision import datasets, transforms

from scipy import stats
import keras_ocr
import cv2

torch.manual_seed(0)
use_cuda = torch.cuda.is_available()
device = torch.device("cuda" if use_cuda else "cpu")

# ### Load the Model
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epsilons = [0, .05, .1, .15, .2, .25, .3]
filename = "models/inception_v3.pt"
filename2 = "models/tsr_resnet152_25_9_10PM.pt"
use_cuda=True
device = torch.device('cuda')

model = models.inception_v3(pretrained=True,aux_logits=False).to(device)
model.fc = nn.Linear(in_features=2048, out_features=18).to(device)
# Load the pretrained model
model.load_state_dict(torch.load(filename, map_location='cpu'))
# Set the model in evaluation mode. In this case this is for the Dropout layers
model.eval()

model2 = models.resnet152(pretrained=True).to(device)
model2.fc = nn.Linear(in_features=2048, out_features=18).to(device)
# Load the pretrained model
model2.load_state_dict(torch.load(filename2, map_location='cpu'))
# Set the model in evaluation mode. In this case this is for the Dropout layers
model2.eval()

sign_types = ['curve left', 'curve right', 'do not enter',
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'lane end', 'merge', 'pedestrian crossing',
'roundabout', 'school zone', 'signal ahead',
'speed limit 15', 'speed limit 30', 'speed limit 35',
'speed limit 45', 'speed limit 55', 'speed limit 65',
'stop', 'stop ahead', 'yield']

# ### Data Loader

test_transforms = transforms.Compose([#transforms.RandomResizedCrop(size=256,
scale=(0.8, 1.0)),

#transforms.CenterCrop(size=256),

#transforms.ToPILImage(),

transforms.Resize((299,299)),

transforms.ToTensor(),

transforms.Normalize(mean=[0.5, 0.5, 0.5], std=[0.5, 0.5, 0.5])])
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#transforms.Normalize(mean=[0.485, 0.456, 0.406], std=[0.229, 0.224, 0.225])])

test_data = datasets.ImageFolder('my_data_aug/test/', test_transforms)
test_loader = torch.utils.data.DataLoader(test_data, batch_size=1,shuffle=True)

def ocr(x):
images = []
n_images = x.shape[0]
for i in range(n_images):
im = x[0].cpu().permute(1,2,0)
im = im*0.5+0.5
im = im.detach().numpy()
im = im*255
images.append(im)
prediction_groups = pipeline.recognize(images)
word_list = ['signal', 'stop', 'ahead', 'speed', 'limit', '15', '30', '3o', '35', '45', '55', '65',
'lane', 'ends', 'do', 'not', 'enter', 'yield', 'merge', 'pedestrian', 'school']
data = torch.zeros(n_images,len(word_list))
for i in range(n_images):
n_words = len(prediction_groups[i])
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for j in range(n_words):
word = prediction_groups[i][j][0]
for k in range(len(word_list)):
if(word == word_list[k]):
data[i,k] = 1
return data

def sd(x):
n_images = x.shape[0]
data = torch.zeros(n_images,4)
for i in range(n_images):
im = x[0].cpu().permute(1,2,0)
im = im*0.5+0.5
im = im.detach().numpy()
im2 = cv2.normalize(im, None, 0, 255, cv2.NORM_MINMAX,
cv2.CV_8UC1)
im2 = cv2.cvtColor(im2, cv2.COLOR_RGB2BGR)
im2 = cv2.cvtColor(im2, cv2.COLOR_BGR2GRAY)
_,threshold = cv2.threshold(im2, 140, 255, cv2.THRESH_BINARY)
contours,_ = cv2.findContours(threshold, cv2.RETR_TREE,
cv2.CHAIN_APPROX_SIMPLE)
areas = []
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sides = []
for cnt in contours:
area = cv2.contourArea(cnt)
if area > 1000:
approx = cv2.approxPolyDP(cnt, 0.02 * cv2.arcLength(cnt,
True), True)
areas.append(area)
sides.append(len(approx))
if(len(areas)<=1):
n_side = 0
elif(len(areas)==2):
ar_ind = np.argsort(areas)[-1]
n_side = sides[ar_ind]
else:
ar_ind = np.argsort(areas)[-2]
n_side = sides[ar_ind]
if(n_side>15):
n_side = 15
side_bin = [int(j) for j in list('{0:04b}'.format(n_side))]
side_bin = side_bin[-4:]
data[i,:] = torch.Tensor(side_bin)
return data
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def rancrop(data):
trans = transforms.RandomCrop((280,280))
trans2 = transforms.Resize((299,299))
sample = 8
sample_list = []

for i in range(sample):
img = trans(data)
img = trans2(img)
sample_list.append(img)

return sample_list

def rancrop2(data):
trans = transforms.RandomCrop((208,208))
trans2 = transforms.Resize((224,224))
sample = 10
sample_list = []

for i in range(sample):
img = trans(data)
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img = trans2(img)
sample_list.append(img)

return sample_list

#imarr = np.array(im)
#print(imarr.shape)
#plt.imshow(imarr)
#plt.show()
#c_true_label = true_label.copy()
#plt.imshow((c_cln_data[0].permute(1, 2, 0)*0.5 + 0.5))
#plt.title(sign_types[true_label[0]])
#plt.show()

def plot_classification_report(cr, title='Classification report ', with_avg_total=False,
cmap=plt.cm.Blues):

lines = cr.split('\n')

classes = []
plotMat = []
for line in lines[2 : (len(lines) - 3)]:
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#print(line)
t = line.split()
# print(t)
if(len(t)==0):
break
classes.append(t[0])
v = [float(x) for x in t[1: len(t) - 1]]
#print(v)
plotMat.append(v)

if with_avg_total:
aveTotal = lines[len(lines) - 1].split()
classes.append('avg/total')
vAveTotal = [float(x) for x in t[1:len(aveTotal) - 1]]
plotMat.append(vAveTotal)

return plotMat, classes

# ### Create Attack

#adversary = CarliniWagnerL2Attack(model,num_classes=18,max_iterations=80)
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adversary = LinfPGDAttack(model, loss_fn=nn.CrossEntropyLoss(reduction="sum"),
eps=0.2)

#adversary = GradientSignAttack(model,eps=0.1)

count = 0

jpeg_filter = JPEGFilter(quality=50)
bit_squeezing = BitSqueezing(bit_depth=4)
binary_filter = BinaryFilter()

pipeline = keras_ocr.pipeline.Pipeline()

y_true = []
y_pred1 = []
y_pred2 = []
y_pred3 = []
y_pred4 = []
y_pred5 = []
y_pred6 = []
y_pred7 = []
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trans = transforms.Resize((224,224))

for cln_data, true_label in test_loader:

#print ('itr : ', count , end='\t')
count += 1

cln_data, true_label = cln_data.to(device), true_label.to(device)
#plt.imshow((torch.squeeze(cln_data).cpu().permute(1, 2, 0)*0.5 + 0.5))
#plt.title(sign_types[true_label])
#plt.show()

# create the attack.
#adv_untargeted = cln_data
adv_untargeted = adversary.perturb(cln_data, true_label)
adv_untargeted = adv_untargeted.to(device)
adv_inception = adv_untargeted
adv_resnet = trans(adv_untargeted)

jf = jpeg_filter(adv_inception).to(device)
bs = bit_squeezing(adv_inception).to(device)
bf = binary_filter(adv_inception).to(device)
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# sample_list = rancrop(adv_inception)
# pred_rc = torch.zeros(len(sample_list), dtype=torch.int32)
# for i in range(len(sample_list)):
# pred = model(sample_list[i])
# pred_rc[i] = predict_from_logits(pred).to(device)
# pred_rc = pred_rc.to(device)
# rc_mode = stats.mode(pred_rc.cpu().numpy())[0][0]
# pred1 = rc_mode

pred1 = predict_from_logits(model(adv_inception)).to(device)
pred1 = pred1.cpu().numpy()[0]

data = ocr(adv_inception)
data = data.numpy()[0]
#print(data)

sample_list1 = rancrop(adv_inception)
pred_rc1 = torch.zeros(len(sample_list1), dtype=torch.int32)
sample_list2 = rancrop2(adv_resnet)
pred_rc2 = torch.zeros(len(sample_list2), dtype=torch.int32)
for i in range(len(sample_list1)):
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temp1 = model(sample_list1[i])
pred_rc1[i] = predict_from_logits(temp1).to(device)
for i in range(len(sample_list2)):
temp2 = model2(sample_list2[i])
pred_rc2[i] = predict_from_logits(temp2).to(device)
pred_rc1 = pred_rc1.to(device)
pred_rc2 = pred_rc2.to(device)
pred_rc = torch.cat((pred_rc1,pred_rc2))
rc_mode = stats.mode(pred_rc.cpu().numpy())[0][0]
pred7 = rc_mode

if(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 2
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 3
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0])):
pred2 = 4
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0])):
pred2 = 5
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1])):
pred2 = 7
elif(np.array_equal(data,[1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
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pred2 = 8
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) or
np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 9
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,1,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) or
np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) or
np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) or
np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 10
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) or
np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 11
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) or
np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 12
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) or
np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 13
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0]) or
np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 14
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
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pred2 = 15
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,1,1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 16
elif(np.array_equal(data,[0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,0])):
pred2 = 17
else:
pred2 = pred7

pred3 = stats.mode(pred_rc1.cpu().numpy())[0][0]

pred4 = predict_from_logits(model(jf)).to(device)
pred4 = pred4.cpu().numpy()[0]

pred5 = predict_from_logits(model(bs)).to(device)
pred5 = pred5.cpu().numpy()[0]

pred6 = predict_from_logits(model(bf)).to(device)
pred6 = pred6.cpu().numpy()[0]

y_true.append(true_label.cpu().numpy()[0])
y_pred1.append(pred1)
y_pred2.append(pred2)

124

y_pred3.append(pred3)
y_pred4.append(pred4)
y_pred5.append(pred5)
y_pred6.append(pred6)
y_pred7.append(pred7)

#if(count==5): break

con_mat1 = confusion_matrix(y_true, y_pred1, labels =
[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17])
con_mat2 = confusion_matrix(y_true, y_pred2, labels =
[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17])
con_mat3 = confusion_matrix(y_true, y_pred3, labels =
[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17])
con_mat4 = confusion_matrix(y_true, y_pred4, labels =
[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17])
con_mat5 = confusion_matrix(y_true, y_pred5, labels =
[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17])
con_mat6 = confusion_matrix(y_true, y_pred6, labels =
[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17])
con_mat7 = confusion_matrix(y_true, y_pred7, labels =
[0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17])
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print(con_mat1)
print(con_mat2)
print(con_mat3)
print(con_mat4)
print(con_mat5)
print(con_mat6)
print(con_mat7)
cr1 = classification_report(y_true, y_pred1)
cr2 = classification_report(y_true, y_pred2)
cr3 = classification_report(y_true, y_pred3)
cr4 = classification_report(y_true, y_pred4)
cr5 = classification_report(y_true, y_pred5)
cr6 = classification_report(y_true, y_pred6)
cr7 = classification_report(y_true, y_pred7)
print(cr1)
print(cr2)
print(cr3)
print(cr4)
print(cr5)
print(cr6)
print(cr7)
print(accuracy_score(y_true, y_pred1))
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print(accuracy_score(y_true, y_pred2))
print(accuracy_score(y_true, y_pred3))
print(accuracy_score(y_true, y_pred4))
print(accuracy_score(y_true, y_pred5))
print(accuracy_score(y_true, y_pred6))
print(accuracy_score(y_true, y_pred7))
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